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THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT AND THE DEFAULT RULE
PROJECT
Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scott**
The common law developed over centuries a small set of default rules
that courts have used to fill gaps in otherwise incomplete contracts be-
tween commercial parties. These rules can be applied almost inde-
pendently of context: the market damages rule, for example, requires
a court only to know the difference between market and contract pric-
es. When parties in various sectors of the economy write sales con-
tracts but leave terms blank, courts fill in the blanks with their own
rules. As a consequence, a judicial rule that many parties accept must
be "transcontextual": parties in varied commercial contexts accept
the courts' rule by writing contracts that contain just the gap the rule
could fill. A long-standing project of academics and lawyers attempts
to supplement common law contract rules with substantive default
rules and default standards. This project has produced Article 2 of the
UCC and the Second Restatement of Contracts and the project plans
to produce more privately created contract law. We show that the
"default rule project" could not create substantive default rules be-
cause the contract terms for which the rules would substitute are
commonly context dependent: the terms' content either is a function of
particular parties' circumstances or a particular trade's circumstanc-
es. Members of the default rule project, whom we call "drafters, "
could not access the information needed to create efficient rules that
require such local knowledge. Instead, the drafters supplied commer-
cial parties with default standards that courts can apply transcontex-
tually in addition to or as replacements for the common law rules.
Contracts sometimes do contain standards, but only when the stand-
ards are accompanied by substantive terms from which courts can in-
fer the parties' contracting goals and thus apply the standards to ad-
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vance them. The drafters' decision to adopt unmoored standards was
a mistake because commercial parties do not accept, and thus con-
tract out of the statutory and restatement default standards. In con-
trast, the common law's transcontextual default rules continue to
stand Our analysis explains the default rule project's past failures
and their current consequences: the Article thus illuminates the con-
tract law we have even as it cautions that the default rule project must
materially change else it risk repeating past errors.
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Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.1
INTRODUCTION
C ONTRACT laws in advanced economies share three core functions:the state develops criteria for determining which promises are legal-
ly enforceable, interprets contracts in order to determine the meaning of
the parties' promises, and ensures that parties have an opportunity to
freely consent to the promises they make by defining the boundaries of
1 George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Introduction and Reason in Common Sense 284
(1906).
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acceptable bargaining behavior.2 A contract law is more than these core
functions, however, and what individuates the contract laws of particular
countries is what constitutes the rest. Because parties are free to make
their own deals, the rest of contract law plays a residual role; that is, the
law is the rules and standards that specify by default parts of contracts
when parties leave them blank. Many scholars believe that filling the
gaps is the most important task that private lawmakers today must per-
form in order to keep contract law relevant for complex, heterogeneous,
and evolving economies.3 In this Article, we challenge that belief.
Our focus is American contract law. Here, the claim that the bulk of
contract law is (and should be) comprised of legally created default rules
and standards has organized contract law scholarship for the last four
decades.4 In the United States, default rules and standards originate in
two ways. Courts necessarily create them in the course of deciding cas-
es. Judicial creations that many courts accept and that last for decades
(or more) constitute the common law of contract. In addition, the Amer-
ican Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), private lawmaking groups
that we collectively call "drafters," have created default rules and stand-
ards for Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")' and the
two contracts restatements. The drafters may also propose default rules
and standards for other restatement projects that are planned or are cur-
rently underway. Some of the default terms that the drafters have pro-
duced instantiate aspects of the common law, but others have been de-
rived independently.
2 Courts alone commonly perform the first two functions. The task of policing contracts
for fraud and overreaching, and undertaking to prevent unconscionable bargains, is, howev-
er, shared among courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. For a discussion on this
to ic, see Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 3-4 (5th ed. 2013).
See, e.g., infra note 117.
4 Infra note 117.
Our Article refers to the collective efforts of the persons who participate directly in creat-
ing uniform laws and restatements and to the lawyers and academics who help them as "the
default rule project." In the behavioral literature and elsewhere, the term "default rule"
sometimes refers to a contract term that a party supplies and that its counterparty can accept
or reject. For example, a firm proposes a particular retirement plan contribution to its em-
ployees. We do not discuss such privately supplied terms here. Rather, we address the pro-
cess by which courts and drafters supply rules and standards to fill gaps in otherwise incom-
plete contracts. These rules and standards are legally binding when included in a code unless




This Article makes three claims. Our first claim is descriptive. Ex-
tending prior work,6 we show that the default rule project has been una-
ble to supplement the common law of contract with default rules and
standards that can efficiently fill gaps in incomplete business contracts.
The drafters implicitly recognized the difficulty of creating efficient de-
fault rules, and proposed few rules for the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts ("Restatement") and the UCC. Our second claim is normative. In
place of rules, the drafters proposed numerous default standards to re-
place or to supplement the common law defaults. We argue that the turn
to standards was misguided. Third, and returning to positive analysis, we
show that the common law is a better institution than the private law-
making bodies for creating contract law defaults that contracting parties
will accept. These claims explain both the failure and the current conse-
quences of past default rule projects and counsel against drafters using
the same tools that failed previously when undertaking future restate-
ment or commercial code projects.
Two distinctions will clarify these claims. The first applies the famil-
iar distinction between rules and standards to contract issues. A rule, or a
"rule-like" contract term, specifies required behavior in advance of the
contracting parties' actions; a standard authorizes a court later to decide
whether actions the parties have already taken satisfied the relevant con-
tractual requirement. Illustrating this distinction, a contract term that ob-
ligates a seller to repair or replace defective product parts provided the
buyer notifies the seller of a defect within ninety days after sale would
be a contractual rule because it tells the parties what to do before they
6 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
Yale L.J. 541 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory]; Alan Schwartz, Con-
tract Theory and Theories of Contract Regulation, 92 Revue D'tconomie Industrielle 101
(2000); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 389 (1993) [hereinafter Schwartz, Default Rule Paradigm]; Alan
Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law 277, 277-83 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts];
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847
(2000); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19
J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The Jurisprudential
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 149 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds.,
2000).
7 We limit our analysis in this Article to default rules and standards that are designed to fill
gaps in contracts between commercial parties. Consumer contracts raise different issues,
which we do not address.
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begin to implement the contract. If the ninety-day notice rule were en-
acted in a statute, it would be a legal default rule for the same reason. A
contract promise to repair or replace defective parts provided the buyer
gives the seller reasonable notice of a defect would be a contract stand-
ard because it delegates to a court the question whether the notice the
buyer did give was reasonable. Similarly, if the reasonableness require-
ment were enacted in a statute it would be a legal default standard.
The second distinction we make is between "contextual" rules and
standards and "transcontextual" rules and standards. In this Article, a
"context" is an economic environment populated by agents with the
same or similar contracting preferences. A context may be as small as
the parties to a particular contract, but commonly is larger. For example,
parties that trade wheat use contracts with the same or similar delivery
terms and storage requirements. Hence, the wheat trade is a "context."'
Returning to the illustration above, the term requiring notice of defects
within a specified time is contextual because parties in different indus-
tries likely would choose different periods within which to make claims.
An efficient notice term turns on how easy a defect is to discover, the
nature of the goods, the seller's ability to repair or replace, and similar
factors. Thus, because wheat is perishable while machines are not, the
contract term requiring notice of a defect commonly differs between the
wheat context and machine contexts.
When a contract does not regulate when the buyer must give notice, a
default rule could efficiently fill the gap only if it too is conditioned on
the same variables that would have influenced the parties' choice of a
rule-like term had the parties dealt with the issue. Therefore, default
rules governing notice of defects should differ between wheat and ma-
chine contexts. In contrast, if contracts generally require promisees to
give reasonable notice, a court could find that a promisee who notified
the promisor of a defect on the eighty-ninth day after sale would have
behaved reasonably in some industries, but not in others. Similarly, a de-
fault standard of reasonable notice would permit a court to make such
context-by-context reasonableness findings. The reasonable notice
standard, therefore, is "transcontextual"; courts could apply the same
standard to evaluate parties' behavior in many contexts. And to general-
A contract term is "parameter specific" when it conditions on payoff relevant variables
that are specific to the parties. Thus, the wheat trade is a context, but the quantity term in




ize the example, standards are intrinsically transcontextual while rela-
tively few rules can be efficiently applied across contexts.
These distinctions permit us to state our three claims more precisely.
Because most contract terms are contextual, it follows that default rules
that substitute for those terms must be contextual as well. As a conse-
quence, the Restatement and UCC drafters would have had to create a
large number of contextual rules for many contracting problems. For ex-
ample, had the UCC attempted to regulate notice-of-breach issues with
rules, the drafters would have been required to create a menu of rules
governing notice, each of which would have solved the problem of
choosing an efficient notice period for a particular context or for similar
contexts. It may be apparent, and it is our claim, that drafters could not
then and cannot now create efficient defaults such as these. The UCC
and the Restatement apply to the entire U.S. economy. There are so
many contexts in this economy that the drafters could not access the
necessary context information (what is maximizing for parties that
transacted in context X may not have been maximizing for parties that
transacted in context Y); nor could the drafters, even if well informed,
create the very large number of rules that parties functioning in these
contexts would require.
The default rule project could have responded to this constraint by on-
ly proposing transcontextual default rules. There are, however, just a
few transcontextual default rules, and most of them had already emerged
through the common law process.' Here, the drafters wisely followed the
common law; most of the transcontextual UCC and Restatement default
rules were adopted from prior judicial creations.'0 The default rule pro-
ject thus could have narrowly focused on the task of assembling and re-
affirming the common law transcontextual defaults, and where possible
creating additional default rules that also could function transcontextual-
ly. But the drafters rejected this limited approach and instead adopted
the common legal strategy of enacting standards." The UCC and the Re-
statement thus contain many default standards: business parties must be-
See infra text accompanying notes 33-49 and 77-79.
0 Infra text accompanying notes 33-49 and 77-79.
11 Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the
Common Law, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1241, 1244 (2015) (emphasizing that "most common law
concepts are structured as legal standards"). We note that the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts adhered relatively closely to the prior common law of contract. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts has many more standards.
1528 [Vol. 102:1523
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have "reasonably," 12 act "in good faith," 3 perform "seasonably,"1 4 ob-
serve customs," and the like; and goods must be "merchantable" 16 or "fit
for ordinary purposes."
To be sure, transcontextual standards are common in other private law
fields. But contract law is different from fields such as torts and proper-
ty. These bodies of law largely operate independently of, or prior to,
transactions. Thus, negligence law applies when the parties' first contact
is the accident and property law creates the rights that parties may later
trade. Because tort and property law apply everywhere, courts regulate
with transcontextual standards. And because these standards are sup-
posed to channel behavior in particular ways, it is of little moment that
the agents on whom the standards operate may prefer to act in other
ways. In contrast, contract law applies to trades whose content agents
usually are permitted to affect.
These differences make the project of creating default standards for
contract law incoherent and ineffectual. A good default solution to a
contracting problem must satisfy an "acceptability constraint": many
parties must prefer the default to alternative resolutions.' Thus, the
drafters' role is to provide public goods: the UCC and the Restatement
should supply default terms that solve contracting problems when typi-
cal contracting dyads cannot as easily solve those problems for them-
selves. Parties, however, can write a standard-behave "reasonably"-at
virtually no initial cost. Therefore, the function of providing default
standards cannot be justified by the drafters' ability to solve those con-
tracting problems that transaction costs prevent private parties from
12 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-303(e), 2-204(3), 2-206(1)(a), 2-206(2), 2-209(5), 2-305(1), 2-
309(1), 2-504(a), 2-609 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2014); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 30, 33, 34, 41, 53, 56 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
13 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-209 cmt. 2, 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1).
14 See, e.g., id. §§ 2-206(1)(b), 2-207(1), 2-311(3), 2-325(1)-(2), 2-508(1).
15 See, e.g., id. §§ 1-201(b)(3), 1-205(b).
1 Id. § 2-314(1).
17 Id. § 2-314(2)(c). The drafters sometimes create standards to avoid deciding difficult
political questions: a standard delegates power to courts, and drafters choose them when they
want to create the impression that they have solved a problem that they actually have dele-
gated to judges. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 616 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Political
Economy]. We discuss this motive briefly in Part IV below, but our principal focus here is
on another drafter motive for enacting default standards-the practical difficulty of creating
efficient default rules.
18 The text's phrase was first used in Schwartz, Default Rule Paradigm, supra note 6, at
392
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solving. Moreover, as we will show, the drafters' actions are ineffectual
because commercial parties dislike transcontextual standards: the broad
discretion they grant to courts increases the costs of contract enforce-
ment while not reducing the costs of contract drafting. Hence, publicly
supplied standards increase total contracting costs.19 Commercial parties
thus contract away from legally supplied standards to the extent the law
permits: parties prefer to solve contracting problems with rules and con-
textual standards.20 In sum, the Restatement and UCC drafters could not
create many new default rules and should not have created new default
standards. A properly functioning default rule project thus would at best
have a very limited objective.2 1
This conclusion leads to our third claim: the common law has been a
good vehicle for creating transcontextual default rules. There are two in-
terrelated reasons why common law courts enjoy a comparative ad-
vantage in rule creation. First, courts necessarily apply common law
rules in various contexts. Second, courts cannot continue to apply a con-
tract default rule that commercial parties would reject because parties
19 See infra Part IV. Total contracting costs are a function of both the "front end" costs of
negotiating and drafting a contract term, as well as the "back end" costs of enforcing that
term in case of a dispute. The effect of a default standard is to shift contracting costs from
the front end to the back end by delegating broad discretion to a later court to apply the term
to the particular context that presents ex post. As we show below, parties opt out of default
standards because the shifting of costs to the back end in this way actually increases total
contracting costs. For earlier analyses, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipat-
ing Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation]; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the
Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 196-97 (2005) [hereinafter Scott
& Triantis, Incomplete Contracts].
20 We later show in Part V that parties often use what we call "contextual standards." See
Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19, at 851-56 (reporting the results of a
sample of contracts that combino standards with rules so as to confine a court's discretion).
As an example, a franchise contract may list a large number of carefully specified duties-
i.e., rules-to govern the franchisee's behavior, and also require the franchisee to use "best
efforts" to conduct the business. Id. at 853-55. The standard applies to franchisee actions (or
inaction) that the parties could not anticipate. Id. A court can infer the parties' contracting
goals from the rules they did write, however, and use these goals to evaluate the unforeseen
actions. Id. at 848-51. The drafters of a UCC or a Restatement section cannot create such
standards because they cannot Imow what antecedent context specific rules would be apt To
continue with our example, the residual drafting strategy of telling parties in every industry
just to make contract claims within a reasonable time is unmoored: such a standard gives
courts no contextual guidance.
21 The comparison we analyze is between courts as rule creators and drafters as rule crea-
tors. A legislature may well have advantages over both institutions at creating rules, but con-
tract law is not a legislative creation.
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would have filled the gap with their own solution: the gap that prompted
the original rule thus would vanish. Hence, a judicially created default
rule can become part of the common law of contract only if parties in
various contexts accept it. Thus, in theory, and also in fact, the rules that
constitute much of the common law of contract are transcontextual; their
solutions to contracting problems apply generally.2 2 These rules have
two features: they are general and they are definitive. Market damages
are a general rule because they create a transcontextual formula: courts
can compare the market price to the contract price wherever there are
market prices. A definitive rule clearly resolves a case. The common law
impossibility doctrine-in which the performance of the contract de-
pends on the continued existence of a given person or thing-is an ex-
ample: it tells courts either to enforce the contract or to excuse the prom-
isor, depending on whether the parties intended to make continued
existence of the person or thing a condition of the seller's duty to ten-
der.23 The Restatement and UCC rules that business parties commonly
accept thus unsurprisingly have been drawn from the common law.24
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we address history to show
how common law courts developed rules and standards when contract
enforcement was divided between law and equity. With the merger of
law and equity and the embodiment of the merged doctrine in the proto-
type of the executory contract, the creation of new defaults through the
common law courts slowed. In response to the perceived limitations of
the common law rules, legal realist scholars urged the substitution of
transcontextual standards. Part II then unpacks the mechanism by which
the common law courts created the defaults that satisfy an acceptability
constraint: common law default rules necessarily are transcontextual be-
cause they can become rules only when and because parties that func-
tion in very different contexts accept them rather than contract out.
22 COmmon law standards have survivorship value in some fields because courts can infuse
them with new meanings over time. See Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 11. We ar-
gue, though, that contract law standards created by drafters have little survivorship value in
business contexts. In contrast, the common law standards that continue to survive are primar-
ily mandatory obligations.
23 See, e.g., Howell v. Coupland (1876) 1 QBD 258, 261 (Eng.); Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)
122 Eng. Rep. 309 (KB). For discussion of the definitive characteristics of the common law
im ossibility doctrine, see Scott & Kraus, supra note 2, at 84-94.
For example, the Restatement (Second) and the U.C.C. republish the common law im-
possibility doctrine in Sections 262-63 and Section 2-613, respectively. Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, §§ 262-63 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-613 (2014); cf. sources supra note 23 (dis-
cussing common law impossibility doctrine).
20 16] 153 1
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In Part III, we show why the default rule project not only has been
unable to replicate the common law process of creating transcontextual
defaults but also has been incapable of creating contextual default rules
that can satisfy an acceptability constraint. We analyze majoritarian,
penalty, and sticky defaults and show in each case that the drafters have
faced a Hobson's choice: either reproduce (or attempt to enhance) the
limited set of common law transcontextual default rules or develop
standards to further regulate business contracts. The drafters chose to
propose standards, and in Part IV we argue that this approach was a mis-
take. Part V then turns to contractual practice and explores how business
parties combine rules and standards in context-specific ways; these con-
tract terms are commonly conditioned on information that is particular to
the parties. This Part stresses the lack of fit between UCC and Restate-
ment standards and what business parties commonly do. Finally, we
briefly summarize our principal claims.
We conclude this introduction with three comments. First, our decon-
struction of the UCC and the Restatement has current relevance. Courts
today must apply these privately created laws to business contracts.
Their work should be aided by a better understanding of why the laws
actually are unsuited to regulate the contracts the courts see. Second, our
analysis of the default rule project both explains the present and consti-
tutes a caution for the future. The drafters' failure to create useful de-
fault terms for business contracts in the Restatement and the UCC is an
object lesson for future drafting projects that may similarly seek to cre-
ate default rules for commercial parties. There are ongoing efforts to
produce a Restatement of Liability Insurance, a new Restatement of
Property, and a Restatement of Consumer Contracts.25 Although these
projects, together with the recently approved Restatement of Restitu-
26 dftion, raise different challenges than the provision of default terms for
business contracts, they will inevitably consider issues that involve the
creation of new or different default rules that also may depart from those
that have emerged through the common law process. Moreover, a pro-
ject to draft a third Restatement of Contracts may well be launched with-
in a year or two, and it is conceivable that pressure will mount for draft-
ers to attempt once again a comprehensive revision of Article 2
25 Am. Law Inst., Current Projects, https://www.ali.org/projects [https://perma.cc/7G4V-
6WYX].
26 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
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(notwithstanding the failure of earlier revision efforts).27 We show here
that if current drafters use the extant lawmaking process to create future
products, those products will likely be as unsuccessful as the contract
law that governs today. Third, and relatedly, this Article is not normative
in the usual sense. We do not ask what a good business contract law
would be; rather, we ask what contract law is possible in an advanced
economy with a general commitment to freedom of contract. Our ulti-
mate substantive claim, in brief, is that it is not possible to go much be-
yond the common law without abandoning this commitment.
I. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF DEFAULT RULES AND STANDARDS
A. The Roots of the Default Rules of the Common Law.
Although now firmly entrenched in doctrine, the contemporary under-
standing of state-supplied default rules and standards is a relatively re-
cent development in contract law.28 At early common law, there was no
cause of action for breach of an informal (unsealed) executory promise.
The only actions available for breach of contract were the action for debt
and the action in covenant (for promises under seal). 2 9 The notion of de-
fault rules for breach was foreign to either action. The action for debt lay
only for the recovery of a sum certain. One party was seeking relief for a
debt that was due and owing, fixed by the parties' prior agreement and
realized in a judgment. The court would award payment or not, but there
was neither a judicial gap-filling role nor court-awarded compensation
27 The default rule project is considering future projects because today's law is out of date.
Article 2 of the U.C.C. was largely completed by 1952 and the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts was adopted in 1979. U.C.C. Preface, at iii; Restatement (Second) of Contracts. A fu-
ture Article 2 or Restatement would have a wealth of new legal scholarship from which to
draw and sixty-three or thirty-six years, respectively, of new case law to consider. For pro-
spects of a third Restatement, see Email from Richard Revesz, Exec. Dir., Am. Law Inst., to
authors (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:25 PM) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For
discussion of the reasons for the failure of the earlier efforts to revise Article 2, see William
H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 Duq. Bus. L.J. 131 (2009).
28 This Part draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the
Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1428, 1436-47 (2004)
[hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options].
29 James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays 92, 122-
23 (1913); John H. Langbein et al., History of the Common Law: The Development of An-
glo-American Legal Institutions 322 (2009); A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common
Law of Contract 46-47 (1987).
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for breach.30 Throughout the eighteenth century, contract law was still
dominated by the action in debt and commercial exchange was not con-
ceived in terms of future returns; as a consequence, default rules that as-
signed unanticipated risks and specified the consequences of nonperfor-
mance were simply inapt and thus unknown.3 1 The common law courts
that granted recovery for an action in debt were, in essence, specifically
enforcing the parties' actual bargain.
Executory contracts thus were not enforced in the United States until
the early nineteenth century.32 This development coincided with a period
of commercial expansion and with the emergence of markets in stock
transactions and commodities.3 3 Courts began awarding market-based
damages for failure to deliver stock certificates in a rising market34 and
30 See Ames, supra note 29, at 88-89. Where a seller tendered goods to a buyer and the
buyer refused to accept delivery, the seller could sue in debt for the purchase price and force
the buyer to take delivery of the goods (for which title had passed under the contract). Alter-
natively, if the buyer tendered the purchase price and the seller refused to transfer goods that
were then available, the buyer's only recourse was to bring an action in equity for specific
performance because the remedy at law was inadequate. Id.
31 Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 917 (1974). Horwitz cites only two English cases in the eighteenth century that even
raise the issue of a default measure of damages. Id. at 921. In Flureau v. Thornhill, the court
limited the plaintiff to restitution damages, holding that the plaintiff could not "be entitled to
damages for the fancied goodness of the bargain which he supposes he has lost." Flureau v.
Thornhill (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 635, 635 (KB). In the United States, only a few actions for
breach of executory contracts were brought prior to the Revolution. See, e.g., Boehm v.
Engle, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 15, 15-16 (1767) (allowing the seller to sue for the price of a
breached contract for the sale of land).
32 See Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. 395, 405-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). Under the older com-
mon law rule, when a buyer breached a contract to purchase goods, the seller would have
been required to tender the contract goods and sue for the contract price. But in Sands, the
seller covered on the market by reselling the goods to a third party and then sought damages
based upon the contract'market differential. The court conceded that this was a case of first
imp ression in the United States and granted market damages to the plaintiff. Id.
See Horwitz, supra note 31, at 918, 921-22 (arguing that enforcement of executory
promises did not occur until the rise of industrialization and the development of commercial
markets in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). Horwitz's basic thesis-that
prior to the Industrial Revolution, the common law of contract was dominated by notions of
equity and fairness and that it was thereafter adapted to legitimate the inequalities of the
nineteenth-century market economy-has been vigorously contested. See, e.g., A.W.B.
Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1979).
Simpson's critique does not, however, challenge the basic point that courts did not regularly
enforce executory contracts until the nineteenth century. Rather, the penal bond was the only
device for legal enforcement of commercial exchange transactions in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
4 See, e.g., Groves v. Graves, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 1 (1790).
2016] Default Rule Project 1535
for the breach of fixed-price forward contracts for the delivery of com-
modities." The rule awarding market damages for nonperformance of
stock and commodities transactions was adopted as the default for exec-
utory contracts where the parties had made relation-specific investments.
This link between commodities and stock transactions and executory
contracts led to one of the principal default rules for determining breach
of market contracts: the risks associated with performance of an obliga-
tion assumed by contract are assigned by default to the promisor (absent
prevention by an act of God, the law, or another party to the contract).36
Other default rules evolved to protect the reliability of market contracts
during this period, including the perfect tender rule in the case of sales
of goods,37 the common law indefiniteness doctrine that instructed courts
to declare contracts void for indefiniteness if the parties failed to specify
the outcome for realized states of the world, 3 and the many default rules
governing the process of offer and acceptance of terms.3 9 Contract there-
after became an instrument for managing exogenous price changes in
well-developed markets.40
3 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 200 (1818).
36 The origins of this rule date to Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (KB). The is-
sue before the court was whether a lessee's duty to pay rent was dependent upon his posses-
sion of the property. In answering that question, the court said:
[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is
bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessi-
ty, because he might have provided against it by his contract. And therefore if the les-
see covenant to repair a house, though it be burnt by lightning, or thrown down by en-
emies, yet he ought to repair it.
Id. at 897.
3 See, e.g., Beals v. Hirsch, 211 N.Y.S. 293, 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925) ("[T]he seller is
bound to tender the amount of goods contracted for in order to hold the buyer for perfor-
mance."), affd, 242 N.Y. 529, 530 (1926); Reuter, Hufeland & Co. v. Sala & Co. [1879] 4
CPD 239 (AC) at 239, 247-48.
38 See, e.g., Shepard v. Carpenter, 55 N.W. 906, 906 (Minn. 1893).
3 See, e.g., Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (KB); Fitzhugh v. Jones, 20
Va. (6 Munf.) 83, 86 (1818); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1892] 1 QB 256, 262 (AC).
For discussion, see Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Le-
gal Relations, 26 Yale L.J. 169, 171 (1917).
40 Horwitz, supra note 31, at 941. A market damages default rule was established in Eng-
land in 1826 with the publication of the first treatise announcing a general rule of damages
for failure to deliver goods:
In an action of assumpsit, for not delivering goods upon a given day, the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price, and that which goods of similar
quality and description, bore on or about the day, when the goods ought to have been
delivered
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Over the next one hundred years, as the Industrial Revolution took
hold first in England and then the United States, courts continued to im-
ply terms by default in order to interpret disputed commercial con-
tracts.4 1 These rules had a distinctive character: they were independent
of context. The offer and acceptance rules structured the contracting
process, but not its substance, and the emerging damages rules provided
transcontextual measurement formulas. Thus, for example, by the mid-
1840s, treatise writers could announce a general default rule governing
damages for breach of contract: the breaching party is liable for losses
that were fairly in contemplation of the parties at the time of contract;
that is, the plaintiff must have "turned the mind of the [defendant] to the
consequences likely to ensue from default.A 2 Thereafter, the decision in
Hadley v. Baxendale43 served to extend, rather than to limit, the damages
default rule, granting recovery of consequential damages where the
plaintiff had communicated special circumstances to the defendant indi-
cating that his damages would be unusually large."
Over time, courts developed a justification for implying default terms
as part of a common law court's interpretive responsibility. In 1863, in
Taylor v. Caldwell, Justice Blackburn explained the emerging impossi-
bility default rule as follows:
[T]his implication [of an excusing condition] tends to further the great
object of making the legal construction such as to fulfil[l] the intention
of those who entered into the contract. For in the course of affairs men
in making such contracts in general would, if it were brought to their
minds, say that there should be such a condition.45
In the court's view, had the parties thought about it, they would have
written a term that would have excused the landlord from providing a
Id. at 941 n. 124 (quoting J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts, Not Under
Seal 131-32 (1826)). It was at this point that contract, fully separated from property and
torts, for the first time, granted promisees a property right in the contract itself.
41 See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) (explaining that
the measure of damages "depends on what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to
have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it
assumed, when the contract was made").
42 Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages 112 (2d ed. 1852).
43 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.).
44 See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4
J. Legal Stud. 249, 253 (1975); id. at 279-84 (discussing the conventional understanding of
Hadley).
4 (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (KB).
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substitute hall when fire destroyed the designated hall through no one's
fault.
Subsequently, in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 4 6 JUS-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes generalized the reasoning in the Taylor
case. Courts, he explained, should fill gaps with rules that would be fa-
cilitative for future parties similar to the parties before them:
It is true that as people when contracting contemplate performance,
not breach, they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall hap-
pen in the latter event, and the common rules have been worked out by
common sense, which has established what the parties probably would
have said if they had spoken about the matter. But a man never can be
absolutely certain of performing any contract when the time of per-
formance arrives, and in many cases he obviously is taking the risk of
an event which is wholly or to an appreciable extent beyond his con-
trol. The extent of liability in such cases is likely to be within his con-
templation, and, whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms
which it fairly may be presumed he would have assented to if they had
been presented to his mind.4 7
Judicial default rules thus originated in the presumed intentions of ac-
tual parties and courts chose them also to be acceptable to future parties
who resembled the ones in the originating case. 48 In Globe Refining it-
self, Justice Holmes endorsed the common law default rule of conse-
quential damages as requiring a tacit agreement that the breaching party
would be liable for losses caused by special circumstances.49
B. Rules Versus Standards: The Contrasting Approaches ofLaw and
Equity
The emergence of a set of general, definitive default rules through the
process of common law adjudication was mirrored by a parallel devel-
opment: the invocation of broad standards by courts of equity to soften
the sharp edges of the common law. The English common law applied
46 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
47 Id. at 543 (emphasis added). Some years later, Justice Cardozo used the same reasoning
in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent to adopt the rule of substantial performance in construction cases
on the grounds that "[i]ntention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contem-
plation the reasonable and probable." 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).48 We further elaborate the courts' rule-creating function in Part II below.
49 190 U.S. at 544-45.
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two different sets of doctrines to interpret a disputed contract.so The first
consisted of rules cast in objective terms that minimized the need for
subjective judgment in their application. The rules were administered
strictly, without exceptions for particular contexts in which the applica-
tion of a rule appeared to defeat its purpose. These doctrines originated
in the King's Bench and Common Pleas, the English courts that pro-
duced the corpus of the common law from the twelfth to the nineteenth
century.s" The second set of doctrines consisted largely of equitable
principles originating in the English Court of Chancery, which began to
exercise overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts to hear
cases that in "the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice."52 Sig-
nificantly, these doctrines were framed as transcontextual standards-
principles that provided exceptions to the common law rules in contexts
where the rules seemed to work harsh or unfair results.
The Chancery provided an independent and alternative forum as a re-
sponse both to the procedural constraints imposed on the common law
courts and to the strict, rule-bound inclinations of common law judges.
50 The discussion in this Part draws on Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design
and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1035-45 (2009).
51 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 12, 38, 114 (4th ed. 2002); see,
e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the strict traditional common law
remedy rules for executory contracts). However, very little common law governing contracts
was established before the nineteenth century. It was then that many questions that had been
left to jury discretion as matters of fact began to be isolated as questions of law, with the
common law providing relevant precedents. Langbein et al., supra note 29, at 449-50.
52 Baker, supra note 51, at 117; see also Langbein et al., supra note 29, at 320 ("Chancery
also developed the practice of relieving against a contractual obligation that was enforceable
at common law, in circumstances in which permitting enforcement would have been un-
just.").
53 The common law courts entertained actions only by plaintiffs who presented a writ that
specified the type of claim that the plaintiff was authorized to bring and the kind of relief to
which the plaintiff would be entitled should he prevail. Baker, supra note 51, at 54. The
forms of action authorized in the writs thus defined the content of judicially cognizable
rights. However, the King retained authority to hear exceptional cases in which he believed
the common law was "deficient." As these "exceptional" private suits became more com-
mon, they were referred to the King's council. Later, parties addressed their bills directly to
the Chancellor, who, under the authority of the council, took responsibility for assigning
them to appropriate courts for resolution. Id. at 101. The Chancery always had the power to
create a new writ that would provide a form of action suitable to a plaintiff s complaint. But
when the plaintiffs claim was based on idiosyncratic facts that rendered existing forms in-
adequate, rather than a common complaint for which no form of action existed, the Chancery




In contrast, "[t]he [C]hancellor's eyes were not covered by the blinkers
of [the rules], and he could go into all the facts to the extent that the
available evidence permitted." 54 The Chancery focused solely on the eq-
uities of the case at bar, not the prospective effects of its ruling. Achiev-
ing equity required the Chancery to apply a broad, general standard to
overcome the result of a common law rule that would have directed the
outcome in the particular case. These equity interventions were not
meant to, and did not, displace any of the common law rules. Indeed, for
many years the Chancery's decrees had no formal precedential effect,55
which freed the Chancery from any concern that its contextualized rul-
ings could undermine the consistency and predictability of adjudica-
tion.
C. Rules and Standards in American Contract Law
The system of transcontextual standards created by the Chancery has
left an indelible impression on contemporary American contract law.
The division between the common law courts and the court of Chancery
was a barrier between two incompatible legal regimes. But in the nine-
teenth century, the Chancery was eliminated and law and equity were
merged in both England and the United States. The result was an un-
comfortable combination of legal rules and equitable standards, and it
was this awkward amalgam that formed the matrix of American contract
law.
54 Id. at 104. In its earliest incarnation, the procedure in Chancery was the antithesis of the
procedure in common law courts: no writ was necessary, multiple issues could be joined,
evidence was taken free of formal rules, decisions were made by the Chancellor rather than a
jury, the court was always open, and trials could take place anywhere (including the Chan-
cellor's home). Id. at 103.
ss "In Chancery each case turned on its own facts, and the chancellor did not interfere with
the general rules observed in courts of law. The decrees operated in personam; they were
binding on the parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone else."
Id. at 104. "So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cas-
es, there was no question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law."
Id. at 202.
56 As an example, though common law courts strictly enforced penalty clauses in breached
contracts, equity courts began enjoining such enforcement in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, creating the doctrine that "equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or
forfeiture, where compensation can be made." Langbein et al., supra note 29, at 324 (quoting
Richard Francis, Maxims of Equity 44 (London, B. Lintot 1728)).
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To this day, therefore, American contract law is torn between the pro-
spective view of common law rules and the retrospective dispute resolu-
tion view of equitable standards. American default rules originating in
the English common law courts include the rules of offer and ac-
ceptance," conditions," impossibility," expectation damages, 60 foresee-
ability, 6 1 and indefiniteness. 62 Along with these default rules, American
contract law also absorbed and extended standards originally developed
in the Chancery "to mitigate the rigours of the Common law."6 Such
doctrines include fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation,64 fraudulent
nondisclosure,65 unilateral and mutual mistake,66 and specific perfor-
mance and other injunctive relief,67 as well as equitable principles spe-
cifically designed to vitiate clear common law rules, including the penal-
5 D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations 222 (1999). See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 21-70 (1981) and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
5 A number of "structural" default rules were developed under the broad heading of the
law of conditions, including the doctrines of constructive conditions of exchange, work be-
fore pay, and several others. For discussion, see Scott & Kraus, supra note 2, at 613-15.
5 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 224. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261-63,
261 cmt. a and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
6 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 87-90. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§§ 344(a), 347 cmt. a and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
61 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 229-32. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 351,
351 cmt. b and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
62 Shepard v. Carpenter, 55 N.W. 906 (Minn. 1893).
63 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 203. In general, equity evolved contract doctrines designed to
provide far broader protection against perceived fraud than the common law provided. In
particular, the core equitable contract doctrines provided relief where an agreement was not
fully voluntary or informed. Id. at 208. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 160-
64 and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
6 The equitable defenses of negligent or innocent misrepresentation were the precursors to
the contemporary doctrines of fraudulent and material misrepresentation. Ibbetson, supra
note 57, at 208. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 162, 164 and Reporter's
Notes cited therein. Originally, the equitable antifraud doctrines operated to bar relief for
promisors but did not affect the right to sue at law. See Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 209.
65 The equity defense of wrongful silence was the precursor to contemporary nondisclo-
sure doctrine. See Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 208. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts §§ 161, 164.
66 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 210. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 152-
154 and Reporter's Notes cited therein.
67 Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 206, 213. "The scope of specific performance was unclear,
and plaintiffs seeking such a remedy were drawn into the Chancery." Baker, supra note 51,
at 320 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-369 and Re-
porter's Notes cited therein.
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ty doctrine, 68 the forfeiture doctrine, 69 and the doctrines specifically in-
viting the court to rely on the factual context of the particular dispute in
derogation of the common law rules of interpretation. Many of these
equitable standards were ultimately absorbed into the evolving common
law rules governing fraud, duress, and mistake, often forming an uneasy
relationship with their common law counterparts.7 1 Thus, the rules-
versus-standards tension was an inevitable consequence of the merger of
law and equity.72
Samuel Williston, the author of one of the great twentieth-century
treatises on contracts, smoothed the friction between common law rules
and equitable standards by proposing a purportedly coherent set of de-
fault rules (and exceptions) that could be applied predictably by com-
mon law courts.73 Willistonian rule formalism rested on two basic
68 The penalty doctrine voids any contract clause providing for liquidated damages in ex-
cess of the parties' actual or expected compensatory damages.
By the seventeenth century liability in contract was seen as absolute, in the sense
that, once the parties had reached an agreement, they would in principle be held to it
unless the defendant could point to duress, fraud, or some other vitiating factor. Con-
sistently with this position, the courts' remedies would normally give effect to the
agreement .... This principle was subject to the important qualification that the
courts would not enforce penalties.
Ibbetson, supra note 57, at 213 (footnote omitted). For discussion of the evolution of the con-
temporary penalty doctrine, see Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options, supra note 28, at
1435-47.
69 Baker, supra note 51, at 202-03. The forfeiture doctrine authorizes courts to set aside
implied and express conditions. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229 ("Excuse of a
Condition to Avoid Forfeiture: To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would
cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition
unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange."); see also id. § 225 cmt. a
("Where discharge would produce harsh results, this . .. effect may be avoided by rules of
interpretation or of excuse of conditions." (citations omitted)); id. § 227 cmts. b, c.
7 0 See, e.g., Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 153-57 (W.E.
Grigsby ed., 1st Eng. ed. 1886) (describing the equitable exceptions to the parol evidence
rule).
71 Compare, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(1) (incorporating the common
law rule of fraudulent misrepresentation), with id. § 162(2) (adopting the equitable principle
of innocent misrepresentation). Also note the tension between Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 176(1), reflecting the common law rule governing wrongful threats, and id. § 176(2),
reflecting the more forgiving equitable standard.
72 The balance of this Part draws on Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 23, 50-53
(2014) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context].
73 See, e.g., Williston on Contracts § 631 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) ("[The pa-
rol evidence] rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or something of
the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the parties have reduced
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claims: (1) contract terms could, and should, be interpreted according to
the meaning a typical English language speaker would attach to them;
and (2) written terms have priority over the context that situates a partic-
ular case. 74 Serving as the principal drafter, Williston enshrined his for-
malist approach to contract doctrine in two private law initiatives: the
Uniform Sales Act75 and the First Restatement of Contracts.7 6 The Sales
Act, and to a lesser extent the First Restatement, essentially codified the
common law default rules.n
But the tension between rules and standards persisted beneath the sur-
face of the newly unified law of contract. Because the process of devel-
oping transcontextual default rules had slowed, courts had relatively few
general, definitive default rules with which to fill gaps in incomplete
contracts. The traditional common law response was to dismiss such
contracts as being too indefinite to enforce.79 The inability to "find"
agreement, together with other perceived limitations of the common law
defaults, was elevated to prominence by the legal realists under the lead-
ership of Arthur Corbin and Karl Llewellyn. In particular, Corbin be-
lieved that the common law response of dismissing incomplete contracts
frustrated the parties when they apparently intended to make a legally
binding deal. His solution was to authorize courts, through the use of
standards, to fill in the gaps ex post.80
their agreement to an integrated writing." (footnote omitted)). For discussion, see Dennis M.
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn,
Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169, 187-88 (1989).
74 Patterson, supra note 73, at 187-88.
7 The Uniform Sales Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1906. It was largely based on the English Sale of Goods Act of
1893. Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71 (Eng.); William Twining, Karl Llewellyn
and the Realist Movement 277 (1973); infra note 77.
76 Restatement of the Law of Contracts (Am. Law Inst. 1932).
" See, e.g., Unif. Sales Act §§ 41, 44 (Unif. Law Comm'n 1906) (conforming tender); id.
§§ 64, 67 (market damages); id. § 8 (excuse for destruction of identified goods); id §§ 12, 15
(express and implied warranties); id. § 22 (risk of loss). Similar defaults were also codified
in the English Sale of Goods Act. See generally, Frank Newbolt, The Sale of Goods Act,
1893 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1894).
8 See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 Va. J. 84, 87-90 (2003).
9 The common law indefiniteness doctrine is grounded in the presumed intentions of the
parties. Where the parties did not make their intentions clear, the common law presumed that
the failure to reach an agreement on material terms, where no terms could be objectively
supplied, implied an intention not to be legally bound. See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E.
822 (N.Y. 1916).
8 See, e.g., 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 605 (1960).
1542 [Vol. 102:1523
2016] Default Rule Project 1543
Corbin also advanced the view that the Willistonian default rules for
resolving contractual disputes were legal fictions and that, properly un-
derstood, all interpretation issues were context specific.s" In his view,
courts did (and should) apply contract law tactically in order to imple-
ment meta principles of fairness and natural justice.8 2 When a court was
asked to fill gaps in an incomplete contract, the just result was to deter-
mine the actual intention of the contracting parties. According to
Corbin, in order to capture this intent, all relevant contextual evidence
should be considered on any interpretive issue. Corbin's approach not
only severely undercut the application of the traditional parol evidence
and plain meaning rules, but it called into question the claim of generali-
ty of the common law default rules. Adjudication, he believed, could not
reach a fair result unless the court considered the context of each trans-
action, and the instruments for undertaking that examination were the
transcontextual standards of reasonableness, fairness, and good faith.84
Corbin's view that rules were insufficiently transcontextual greatly in-
fluenced the drafters of the Second Restatement of Contracts, who pro-
posed many transcontextual standards in place of the (seemingly) lim-
ited reach of the relevant common law default rules.
Llewellyn advocated a similar commitment to specific context, alt-
hough he induced the meta principle that courts should apply from the
81 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell
L.Q. 161, 161-63, 189 (1965).8 See Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1, at 3 (one vol. ed. 1952) ("Judges as
well as juries moderate the operation of the law in favor of the poor as against the rich; in
our country it is the comparatively poor who determine what the law is... . For all human
kind justice is relative, not absolute... . When the skies begin to fall, Justice removes the
blindfold from her eyes and tilts the scales.").
83 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 80, § 577 (reflecting Corbin's view in the parol evidence
rule context).
84 Corbin's view was that even if the contract was an unambiguous integration-that is, it
appeared to contain the parties' entire agreement-all relevant extrinsic evidence should be
admissible on the issue of what the contract meant, including evidence of the parties' subjec-
tive intentions. Margaret N. Kniffen, 5 Corbin on Contracts: Interpretation of Contracts
§ 24.7-24.9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1998); Corbin, supra note 81, at 170-71, 188-89.
8 The move from common law rules to broad standards in the Second Restatement is pal-
pable. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981) (replacing the preexisting
duty rule with a fair and equitable standard); id. § 33(2) (introducing an indefiniteness stand-
ard); id. § 261 (supplementing the common law impossibility doctrine with the commercial
impracticability doctrine); id. § 351 (replacing the tacit agreement test of consequential dam-
ages with the reason to know test); id. § 30(2) (the reasonableness test of methods of ac-
ceptance that replaced Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (KB)); id. § 87(2) (the
reliance option).
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common "working rules" that commercial parties used to govern their
affairs.86 On this principle, evidence of the parties' prior dealings, to-
gether with the common usages in their trade, should be admissible on
the question of what the parties' explicit contract meant. This is because
practice and custom formed the implicit background against which mer-
chants practicing within any particular commercial community contract-
ed.87 But since the working rules arose from practice and custom, their
jurisdiction was uncertain: they needed the imprimatur of the state. Le-
gal incorporation was necessary, therefore, in order to tailor the rules to
particular practices and to resolve the troublesome cases where the rele-
vant norms were in dispute.
This notion of incorporation of practice and custom through the de-
vice of transcontextual standards is deeply embedded in Article 2 of the
UCC, of which Llewellyn was the principal drafter." Here, Llewellyn
addressed the incorporation objective by reversing the Willistonian pre-
sumption that parties intended their writings to contain the dispositive
elements of the deal.90 Rather, the Code invites contextualization by first
defining an agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in
their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade" 91 and then defining a
contract as "the total legal obligation that results from the parties'
agreement." 92 In addition, the Code's parol evidence rule permits courts
86 Llewellyn was committed to the idea of filling contractual gaps with default terms that
mimicked the arrangement most (or at least many) commercial parties would have made for
themselves. In his mind, the solution to the dilemma of the poor fit between insufficiently
contextual legal default rules and complex commercial relationships seemed straightforward.
Rather than use abstract, general standards to regulate these relationships, the law should
simply identify and incorporate the "working rules" already being used successfully by par-
ties themselves. See Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009,
1023-24 (2002) [hereinafter Scott, Rise and Fall]; Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the
Origins of Contract Theory, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Commercial and Corpo-
rate Law 12, 15 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
87 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2014) (formerly § 2-208 and cmt. 1).
8 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Foundations of Commercial Law 15 (2010);
Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 1023-24.
89 See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-
49, 51 SMU L. Rev. 275, 282-83 (1998); Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Im-
print on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541, 541-
42, 555-57 (2000); Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 1029-32; Twining, supra note 75,
at 270-301.
90 Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 1038-42.
91 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3).92 Id. § 1-201(b)(12).
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to infer the parties' intentions from trade usage even where the meaning
of the express terms would have been clear to an ordinary English
speaker and the contract seemed "integrated." 93
And so, the tension between rules and standards persists to this day.
The common law courts have continued to be remarkably faithful to the
common law default rules that evolved during the nineteenth century.
This is especially true in New York, one of the largest commercial
states, whose courts retain most, if not all, of the common law default
rules even though the drafters of the UCC and the Restatement replaced
many of them with more contextually sensitive standards.94 To be sure,
only a minority of courts has followed the Second Restatement's prefer-
ence for replacing rules with standards, but the UCC, which regulates
sales of goods, embodies much of Llewellyn's incorporation project, and
it is law everywhere.95 Indeed, the UCC remains regnant even though
courts have seldom attempted the empirical inquiries that, Llewellyn be-
93 Id. § 2-202, cmts. 1, 2. Because Llewellyn's purpose was to incorporate the actual con-
text that commercial parties had developed through their practices, he needed a mechanism
by which these local norms could be identified by courts. He believed that the best mecha-
nism was the merchant tribunal, made up of a panel of experts that would find specific
facts-such as whether the behavior of a contracting party was "commercially reasonable" in
the context of the particular dispute. The idea of the merchant tribunal was too radical for the
commercial lawyers who dominated the UCC drafting process. See, e.g., Revised Uniform
Sales Act § 59 (Unif. Law Comm'n, Second Draft 1941); Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86
at 1040. The merchant tribunal was competent to opine on the effect of any mercantile usage
on the terms of a contract, the mercantile reasonableness of any action by either party and
"[a]ny other issue which requires for its competent determination special merchants'
knowledge rather than general knowledge." Id. § 59(1)(c)-(d). Ultimately, Llewellyn aban-
doned this key device for discovering the relevant context, while still retaining the many
transcontextual standards as the architecture of incorporation. As many have suggested,
eliminating the merchant jury while retaining the pervasive notion of ex post incorporation
of commercial norms was a serious drafting mistake. See Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86,
at 1040; James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's
German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156, 174-75 (1987); Zip-
porah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 465, 505-06, 540-41 (1987).
94 For a discussion of New York's role as the guardian of traditional common law rules,
see Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1475, 1478-80 (2010) ("New York's formalistic rules win out over California's contex-
tualist approach. As predicted by theory, sophisticated parties prefer formalistic rules of con-
tract law.").
See, e.g., id.; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 Yale
L.J. 926, 928 n.1 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux].
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lieved, were required in order to apply the Code's transcontextual stand-
ards so as to facilitate commercial contracting.96
II. COURTS AS CREATORS OF DEFAULT RULES
In Part I we showed that the common law of contract, as created by
courts, is composed of a limited number of transcontextual default rules
and a few mandatory standards imported from equity. But what kinds of
rules and by what process did the common law produce this body of
contract law? And, is this a process that drafters could replicate today?
In this Part, we set out to answer these questions. We first define more
precisely the types of rules the common law has created, and then de-
scribe the mechanism that produced them.
The default rules that common law courts create have a particular
quality that is a function of how courts conceive their role in resolving
contract disputes. Courts invoke the gap-filling--or default rule-
function of contract law when the contract does not deal with the rele-
vant issue. 97 Gaps can exist because parties find it too costly to create
terms to govern every future state whose realization may affect their
deal; rather, parties draft terms to govern likely occurrences. There is a
gap when an unlikely state materializes." The judicial goal in contract
96 Recent research on the medieval law merchant, the formation of rules regarding com-
modity exchanges in early twentieth-century trade associations, and the current practices of a
closed community of cattle-feed traders strongly suggest that ongoing, "traditional" dealings
never crystalize into well-defined, customary rules at all. Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the
Courts, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 63 (2015) [hereinafter Bernstein, Custom in the Courts] (show-
ing that neither parties nor courts introduced rigorous evidence of custom, but rather cases
were decided on party assertions or casual testimony); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Modern Economy, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 238, 250-51 (Gregory
Klass et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Emily Kadens, The Myth of
the Customary Law Merchant, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1153, 1153-59 (2012); Imad D. Abyad, Note,
Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence,
83 Va. L. Rev. 429, 452 (1997) ("The courts in effect are abrogating the responsibility that
the Code drafters assigned to them by treating commercial reasonableness as garden-variety
reasonableness, left for the lay juries to decide on a case-by-case basis with no systematic
structure resulting from their decisions."). This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking
expertise, fall back instead on interested-party testimony and generic standards of reasonable
commercial behavior rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions.
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra, at 249-5 1.97 In contrast, courts invoke the interpretive function of contract law when a contract's
language applies to an issue, but it is arguably unclear just how the parties wanted the issue
resolved.
9 Part IV discusses additional reasons for gaps in contracts.
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cases is to recover and then enforce the parties' apparent intentions as
they existed at the time of contract. This goal implies that courts are re-
luctant to fill gaps with rules that are inconsistent with the ex ante inten-
tions of the contracting parties, in so far as a court can recover those in-
tentions from the issues the contract did resolve. Hence, the contracting
parties' prospective intentions function as a constraint on, and some-
times as a guide to, the courts' rule-creating function. But because courts
know they are creating rules, they also consider the likely intentions of
parties as viewed objectively rather than subjectively; that is, they ask
whether future parties like the parties at bar would accept the courts' de-
fault solution when those parties consider the issue.
This judicial perspective explains why most common law default
rules are either structural or formula-based. A structural rule sets out the
rules of the contracting game; hence, it governs everywhere. As exam-
ples, an acceptance is effective when mailed,99 the risk of loss passes
from the seller to the buyer with a transfer of possession,oo and delivery
of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions.'o Par-
ties create substance within these general rules, but courts need not
know in advance what the various substantive solutions will be.
Formulas are transcontextual because they are content free. Consider
two common law examples: (1) A court should protect the disappointed
promisee's expectation by putting her in the position she would have
been in had the contract been performed;' 02 (2) A court should award the
disappointed promisee the difference between the contract and the mar-
99 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63 (1981).
"0 See U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (2014). The early common law default rule passed the risk of
loss from seller to buyer with the transfer of title to the property. See Tarling v. Baxter
(1827) 108 Eng. Rep. 484, 486 (KB). The same risk of loss rule was instantiated in the Eng-
lish Sale of Goods Act § 20 and the Uniform Sales Act § 22. Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 &
57 Vict. c. 71, § 20 (Eng.); Unif. Sales Act § 22, 1 U.L.A. 117 (1922). Llewellyn successful-
ly argued that this structural default should be changed to attach the risk of loss to the party
in ossession of the goods. Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 1032-33.
See, e.g., Paynter v. James [1867] 2 LRCP 348 (Eng.). This structural common law de-
fault was codified in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893 in § 28, then replicated in the
Uniform Sales Act in § 42, and finally repeated again in the UCC. Sale of Goods Act 1893,
56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 28 (Eng.); Unif. Sales Act § 42, 1 U.L.A. 142 (1922); U.C.C. §§ 2-507
& 2-511.
102 The compensation principle that underscores the expectancy default rule was first an-
nounced as a general principle in Jaquith v. Hudsen, 5 Mich. 123, 133 (1858). The rule has
been incorporated in both the Restatement and the UCC. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 347 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-305(a).
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ket price when there is a market.'0 The first rule directs the court to
compare the relevant counterfactual to the contract; the second rule di-
rects the court to compare the market to the contract. Courts can apply
these formulas wherever there is an accessible market price. Courts and
commentators should ask whether such formulas are efficient or other-
wise desirable in general, and the answers can commonly be derived us-
ing plausible examples.04
We next attempt to explain the process that produced the body of
transcontextual common law defaults with a formal story. Consider a
"super set" of commercial parties, denoted N, which is composed of
subsets of contracting parties, or dyads, who function in various eco-
nomic sectors. One such subset within N thus may be auto-parts makers;
another subset may be wheat farmers. We begin with auto-parts makers
and denote the first dyad to present a court with a particular contracting
gap as n1A e NA, where NA is the subset of auto-parts makers and nlA is
the originating dyad. The court's task is to fill the gap with a rule. There
is a set of rules, denoted SK, from which the court can draw.
The actual judicial goal in contract cases is to recover and enforce the
parties' intentions, as those intentions are objectively manifested at the
time of contracting. This goal implies the two constraints that restrict
common law contract adjudication. First, courts create rules that are
consistent with each litigating dyad's type, as the court discerns that type
from gaps the contract did fill and the evidence presented.10' Parties
would reject a rule that failed to satisfy this constraint were the rule
called to their attention.'" In this example, in the case of first instance, a
103 The market damages default was formalized in England in 1826. Horwitz, supra note
31, at 940 & n.124.
' On the general desirability of protecting the expectation interest, see Daniel Markovits
& Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest,
97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011). On the general desirability of market damages, see Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic
Waste Fallacy, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1610 (2008) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Market
Damages].
105 A contracting dyad's "type"-the dyad subset in which it functions-is just the parties'
intention in making the deal. Courts must recover the type when interpreting a contract be-
cause the interpretive task is to see whether the performance the promisor rendered is con-
sistent with the dyad's type. Thus, a delivery of cottonseed oil would be nonconforming if
the dyad's type meant to trade linseed oil. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualiz-
ing Contract Interpretation, 42 J. Legal Stud. 1, 3-4, 6, 14 (2013). The text argues that courts
will not fill a gap with a rule that is inconsistent with the dyad's type.




court would only choose rules from SK that would be consistent with, or
advance, an auto-parts dyad's contracting goals. The second constraint
holds that the rule must decide the case at bar. An example is the impos-
sibility rule, which courts apply either to excuse or to enforce. Rules that
satisfy the second constraint are "definitive": they decisively resolve the
case.
We let the court choose the contracting solution-rule SA-from the
set SK to decide the first case raising the particular gap, which we sum-
marize as (NA) -- SA. Because other possible contracting dyads in the
auto-parts industry are likely to be similar to the dyad the court first
sees, the notation indicates that rule sA is consistent with the originating
dyad's type and is likely acceptable to later similar parties. We also as-
sume that s decides the case.
Suppose that the next case the court sees involves a contract between
parties in the copper pipe industry. We now describe the originating dy-
ad as nic e Nc: the dyad is drawn from the subset Nc of copper pipe-
producing parties. This dyad's contract also has a gap: it does not cover
a problem that is apparently similar to the problem the prior auto-parts
manufacturer's contract left unresolved. The court can resolve the dis-
pute by filling this gap with a rule. One party urges the court to use rule
s because this rule favors that party and it is a precedent. The court,
however, will choose rule sA in this different context only if SA satisfies
both constraints: the rule appears to be consistent with, or advances, the
contracting goals of parties in the copper pipe industry, and it is defini-
tive. We let (NA, Nc) - sA summarize the result if the court "follows
precedent": this tells us that rule sA decides cases for both the auto-parts
makers and the copper pipe makers-dyad subsets NA and Nc
Now let this process iterate. The court sees cases drawn from a varie-
ty of industries and trades in the superset N and continues to decide them
with rule sA. The process runs forever, but it may be affected by an eco-
nomic change or terminated by systematic contracting out. Business-to-
business internet contracting illustrates the effects of an economic
change: traditional offer and acceptance rules are unsuited to internet
contracts, and the new rules that appear to be emerging may induce
changes in the traditional rules.107 Alternatively, the process can termi-
nate with widespread opting out. Common law courts created the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, which made sellers liable for any
107 See Scott & Kraus, supra note 2, at 259-78.
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damage caused by a breach of warranty. os Beginning in the 1930s, how-
ever, manufacturers routinely disclaimed liability for consequential
damages and began to disclaim the warranty itself. As a consequence,
courts could no longer create or refine implied warranty default rules;
contracts no longer contained "warranty gaps" that the rules could fill.109
That parties can and do opt out of substantive default rules, such as
the implied warranty of merchantability, means that some contracts may
not contain all of the terms that are necessary to make an agreement
binding. When such "gap cases" arise, common law courts apply a
transcontextual default: the indefiniteness rule."o This rule creates an in-
centive for future parties to fill gaps with terms that permit courts to ap-
ply the remedial formulas, or else their contracts will not be enforced.
The rule is transcontextual because it applies to every contract every-
where that does not fill in those blanks, but the rule does not specify
how the blanks should be completed. Put another way, the indefiniteness
rule is a structural information-forcing rule that satisfies the acceptabil-
ity constraint.
Assume, however, that in future cases that raise the "rule sA problem,"
the common law process continues without interruption by an economic
change or a new contracting practice. Hence, courts use rule s to decide
cases involving every dyad type in the contracting superset N whose
contracts contain "s gaps." We summarize the outcome of this process
as {N} --+ sA, which states that sA is the common law rule. And this result
permits us to state the common law mechanism: the judicial rule-
creating process could not iterate in the way we describe if rule SA were
not a good transcontextual default. This is because courts could not ap-
ply sA to fill contractual gaps in a wide variety of contexts unless con-
tracting parties in those contexts let the gaps exist. Hence, when sA has
attained the status of a common law contract default rule, sA necessarily
satisfies the acceptability constraint. No one has to predict, at some time
zero, which of the possible rules-sA, or sB, or sC-will come to be
1 See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L.
Rev. 117, 121-22 (1943); Samuel Williston, Representation and Warranty in Sales-Heilbut
v. Buckelton, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-12 (1913).
10 See generally, Alan Schwartz, Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
Yale L.J. 353 (1988).
110 The indefiniteness rule directs courts to dismiss a case for indefiniteness when the con-
tract at issue is obligationally incomplete. A contract is obligationally incomplete when it
lacks terms, such as a specified quantity to be traded, that permit a court to supply a remedy
on breach. Scott & Kraus, supra note 2, at 30-42.
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widely acceptable. Common law contract rules are widely acceptable
because they are the rules we see."'
The common law rule-creating mechanism does not depend on the as-
sumption that the common law is a good institution for creating contract
law defaults because common law judges are better rule creators than
drafters or other lawmakers.1 12 Rather, the common law mechanism is
effective because it provides courts with repeated opportunities to apply
their rules across contexts. And those opportunities exist because parties
accept just the rules that can be applied in that way.'
III. THE LIMITS OF STATE CREATED DEFAULT RULES
In Part I, we showed that the common law can (and did) create a lim-
ited set of transcontextual default rules, and in Part II we explained how
the common law process of contract rule creation works.1 14 As Part I
1"' We suppose that a default rule is a part of the law if it is "active"; that is, the rule is
used to decide cases through time. A rule announced in, say, an 1850 case that courts never
use again, though on the books if not overruled, is not a part of the living contract law. New
York is the leading common law jurisdiction. A study of the current New York digests
shows the same few rules are continually being cited in a very wide variety of contexts. A
consideration of the digests twenty years ago reveals the same pattern: the rules that are cited
today were cited then, also in a wide variety of contexts.
1 To be fair to the default rule project, the model below of the drafters' rule creation pro-
cess assumes that drafters are excellent rule creators when sufficiently informed, and that
they are public spirited in the sense that their rule choices attempt to maximize social wel-
fare. The problems lie in the process, not in the personnel. As we discuss in Part III infra, the
UCC and Restatement drafters set out to create the sorts of defaults that are the least viable,
and thus are rejected by commercial parties. Even so, UCC and Restatement defaults retain a
salience for courts even after years of nonuse, whereas no such mixed message is delivered
by an iterative common law process that stops when parties opt out of the proposed default
rule. (We are grateful to Andrew Verstein for helping us think through this distinction.).
113 A way to view the common law mechanism is as a set of experiments, in the vein of
Charles Sabel's work. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998). In the analysis above, the "ex-
periment" is to create a particular common law rule. The experiment would be on the way to
success if the copper-pipe makers invited the court to apply the "auto-parts makers' rule" by
leaving the relevant gap in the copper-pipe maker contracts. And the experiment would suc-
ceed-it would ultimately aggregate into a rule-as dyads in more industries leave the same
14 This process is often characterized as an effort to replicate a "hypothetical bargain" be-
tween typical contracting parties. Although this conceptualization may be a useful pedagogi-
cal heuristic, it is nonetheless quite misleading. The effort to mimic a hypothetical bargain is
often thought to be an invention of scholars in the 1970s, who wanted to shift the focus of
judicial analysis of contract disputes toward an ex ante perspective and away from the then-
dominant view that courts should interpret contracts as of the time of litigation. But this view
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showed, during the twentieth century the process of rule creation slowed
while the American economy continued to grow."' The legal realists
and then the drafters sought to modernize the common law by suggest-
ing or creating more sophisticated and more broadly applicable defaults.
In this Part, we show why that project largely restricted itself to the crea-
tion of standards: creating contextual default rules was too difficult. Part
IV then exhibits the unsuitability of regulating business contracts with
the Restatement and UCC standards.
Our discussion of the tension between rules and standards that charac-
terizes the history of the common law of contract may seem to suggest
that there are only two types of defaults courts use to fill gaps. But un-
derstanding the difficulties facing drafters who seek to add to the exist-
ing stock of default rules requires a more complete typology. In fact,
there are three distinct types of contractual default rules in addition to
the structural and formulaic defaults we have just discussed: (1) majori-
tarian and tailored defaults; (2) penalty (or information-forcing) defaults;
and (3) sticky defaults. When the default rule project began, the com-
mon law structural and formulaic defaults were already in place. The
drafters could, and did, propose that the UCC and the Restatements re-
produce many of these common law defaults. On the other hand, there is
a limited role for a project that only recreates what already exists.' 16 The
of what courts do is mistaken, as Part II showed, and it also confuses the courts' role with the
drafters' role, as is made apparent below.
115 While the process of common law default rule creation has slowed, it has not stopped
completely. A recent example of a new transcontextual default that has become widely ac-
cepted is the "binding preliminary commitment" that governs cases where the parties to a
preliminary agreement contemplate further negotiations. The new default rule requires par-
ties to a preliminary agreement to "accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in
good faith in an effort to reach final agreement." Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Neither party, however, has a right to
demand performance of the transaction; rather, if the parties cannot ultimately agree on a
final contract, either may abandon the deal. A federal court recently referred to this way of
enforcing preliminary agreements as the "modern trend in contract law." Beazer Homes
Corp. v. VMIF/Anden Southbridge Venture, 235 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (E.D. Va. 2002). For
additional discussion, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 674-76 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Scott, Precontractual Liability].
116 Participants in restatements sometimes stress the restatements' "aggregation function":
collecting the common law of a field in one place, along with explanations. This is a useful
function and outside our analysis. We do note, though, that state law digests duplicate the
aggregation function to a considerable extent. The contracts digests (see, for example, New
York) thus contain tables of contents that state and categorize all of the rules. The digests
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search for a distinctive and desirable new contribution from the default
rule project thus must turn to other default types.
A. Majoritarian and Tailored Defaults"'
Judicial defaults originate in the intentions of actual parties, and
courts choose them also to be acceptable to future parties who resemble
the ones at bar. Drafters cannot create defaults in the context of adjudi-
cations. Rather, drafters must either create new rules, select a common
law rule to adopt in the infrequent cases when the common law rules dif-
fer, or encourage the law to develop in a particular direction by the rules
they favor and the language they propose. In all of these cases, the draft-
ers exercise discretion, and they need a normative criterion to guide their
choices. We initially suppose that drafters prefer efficient defaults-
those that maximize the utility of the universe of future parties." 9 The
then illustrate how the rules have been applied with summaries of the case law relevant to
each rule.
n7 There is a rich literature on the nature of majoritarian default rules. For a sampling, see
Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1547
(1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821 (1992); David Charny, Hypo-
thetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815
(1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Ex-
amination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977); Ja-
son Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990).
1' The drafters are professors and lawyers who serve on ALI or NCCUSL drafting com-
mittees.
119 More precisely, drafters want to maximize net social welfare. The default rules we ana-
lyze affect business parties, who we assume are risk neutral. Risk neutral business parties'
utility functions are linear in money. Hence, net social welfare, with regard to a possible
rule, is the positive monetary return a rule would create for the business parties that prefer it
less the negative monetary return, if any, the rule would create for business parties that do
not prefer the rule, and less the disutility, monetary and otherwise, the drafters would incur
from creating the rule. We focus below on the drafters' difficulty in predicting the business
parties' monetary returns. Drafters sometimes choose standards with other normative goals
in mind. We discuss this effort in Part IV below. The drafters' task is sometimes described as
creating rules that future parties would otherwise voluntarily adopt were their contracting
costs lower. But because future (business) parties choose contract terms to maximize ex-
pected monetary returns, this goal is equivalent to the goal of maximizing net social welfare.
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literature guides the drafters in this task primarily with the admonition to
create rules that "the majority" of future parties would prefer. 12 0 This
admonition, however, is too difficult to follow: the drafters, we next
show, cannot create default rules that most parties would prefer unless
those rules are transcontextual.
We use a simple model to develop this conclusion. Recall that N is
the superset of contracting parties or dyads. We partition N into sets NA,
NB, and so forth. As before, each set functions in a sector of the econo-
my. Because these sectors can be large and the dyads in them may have
different preferences over terms, we divide the sets of N, such as NA, in-
to subsets such as naa, nab, and so forth. A subset such as naa can have
one or more members. For example, if NA is auto-parts makers, we now
suppose that there may be more than one type of auto-parts maker; the
contracting dyads in a particular subset are a context because they have
the same contracting preferences, but preferences may differ across con-
texts. Thus, every auto-parts member of naa has the same preferences,
but naa types may prefer different contracting solutions than the nab auto-
part types prefer.121 If so, the naa and nab types function in different con-
texts. All contracting parties are risk neutral, and collectively they con-
stitute the demand curve for efficient solutions to contracting problems.
For parties to make a contract K, they must solve P(K) > 1 contract-
ing problems. A contracting problem can be creating a delivery term,
choosing a remedy, specifying quality, and the like. A particular prob-
lem is denoted p1(K); a second problem is denoted pj(K), and so forth.
There is a set of solutions for each problem, where a solution is a poten-
tially maximizing contract term. The set of potentially efficient solutions
to problem pi(K) is denoted S(p) > 1; that is, there may be more than one
possible solution to the problem p;(K). The drafters proceed first by de-
ciding what contracting problem they want to solve with a default rule.
Let's assume the drafters consider problem p;(K), which now is to
choose a termination clause for contracts between electronics manufac-
turers and their retailers. The drafters' second step is to identify S(p)-
120 See, e.g., Scott & Kraus, supra note 2, at 90-94.
121 In Part II, we assumed for convenience that, say, all auto parts contracting dyads had
the same contracting preferences. This assumption was innocuous: as the analysis there
showed, if it was materially false, courts could not create a rule that would be acceptable to
the "auto-parts makers." Here, we relax this homogeneity assumption because we are analyz-
ing substantive (rather than transcontextual) default rules: economic agents are more likely
to have divergent preferences over substance.
1554 [Vol. 102:1523
Default Rule Project
the set of potentially efficient termination clauses. The third step is to
decide which of the theoretically efficient solutions in S(p) the drafters
should cast in the form of a default rule for actual parties to follow. 122
We make two general assumptions when analyzing the drafters' prob-
lem. First, cases such as (NE} - S(p) do not exist. In such cases, every
contracting dyad in the relevant set-here, all of the electronic industry
dyads-would prefer the same rule. A corollary of the first assumption
holds that the drafters cannot propose a rule for every possible contract-
ing preference. In the usual case, at least one dyad set in NE will dislike
the rule the drafters propose. Second, we assume that industries and
trades are small relative to the domain of possible rules. The UCC and
the Restatement of Contracts satisfy this assumption because the domain
of UCC and Restatement rules is the entire U.S. economy; no industry or
trade is large relative to the entire economy. 123
We focus on the drafters' third task: to choose an efficient and im-
plementable rule to propose as the default. Recall that the problem p;(K)
is to create a termination clause for contract K, made between members
of the electronics industry. To simplify this problem, we assume that
S(p) = 2: the drafters can identify two possible solutions to p;(K), denot-
ed rule sl and rule s2 . We also assume that the set of electronics industry
dyads NE can be decomposed into only two contexts: those in which the
n, types function and those in which the neb types function. In the ex-
ample, 0 < a < 1 of the set NE are nea types, who prefer rule s1 , and
122 The text models the drafters' task as choosing a new default rule: that is, a rule that
would direct the efficient solution to a contracting problem. The model applies to the other
drafting tasks as well. Thus, if the drafters are choosing between inconsistent common law
rules, they should choose the rule that maximizes social welfare, which is defined here as the
rule that maximizes parties' net monetary benefits. See supra note 119 and accompanying
text. Using the text's notation, the set S(p) would include the two common law rules, and the
drafters would have to decide which of them to propose as the maximizing restatement or
code default. Similarly, if the drafters want to encourage the law to move in a particular di-
rection, the set S(p would include the rules, or versions of rules, that the drafters believed
would cause courts to decide cases such as to shift the law "correctly." But if the drafters'
goal is to maximize social welfare, the correct direction is the social welfare-maximizing
direction. Hence, the drafters should select from S(p) the rules or rule versions that are direc-
tionally appropriate because they are welfare-maximizing. Thus, no matter how we, or the
drafters, define their task, when drafters have discretion, they must choose from the sets of
possible rules the rule that best advances a normative goal. The model below shows how dif-
ficult these choices have been, and will be, to make when the goal is social welfare maximi-
zation.
123 The smaller the domain over which a possible rule would apply, the easier it is for the
rule creator to predict how the rule would function; there is less for the rule creator to know.
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(1 - a) are neb types, who prefer rule s2 . Rules create benefits, where a
benefit is the increment to the contract's expected surplus that the rule
yields. Rule s' creates the same benefit by for every nea type; rule s 2 cre-
ates the same benefit b 2 for every neb type; b; # b2; and, just to begin,
both b;(s2) and b2(S1) = 0. The last two assumptions hold that the nea dy-
ads derive a different benefit from "their rule" than the neb dyads derive
from theirs; and that dyad types that function in a particular context are
unaffected when drafters choose a default rule for types in other con-
texts. 124
The question is whether drafters who want to maximize net social
welfare should propose rule s' or rule s2 as the legal default. Rule s'
would be the correct choice if it would create greater total benefits for
the members of NE than S2 would. This would be the case if:
aNE(bl) > (1 - a)NE(b 2)-
The left hand side of this inequality is the total benefits the nea dyads
would realize from rule s', and the right hand side is the total benefits
the rule neb dyads would realize from rule s2 . Rearranging terms, the
drafters should propose rule s' if:
(1) > -
b2 a
This simple result teaches several lessons. Initially, the drafters can-
not just propose the rule the majority prefers. For example, if two-thirds
of the market for a solution to problem p;(K) prefers rule s'-the ne dy-
ads-the drafters should nevertheless choose rule S2 if the neb dyads val-
ue s2 more than twice as much as the nea dyads value their rule. 125 And if
the nea dyads are sixty percent of the market, the drafters should propose
rule s 2 if the neb dyads value it more than 1.5 times as much as the nea
124 The last assumption implies, for example, that dyads that prefer rule s1 will not contract
out if the drafters choose s 2. The assumption is unrealistic: in the usual cases, dyads that pre-
fer si will either get some benefit from s2 or incur a cost from s2. We discuss these cases be-
low.
125 To clarify the arithmetic, if 2/3 of NE prefer s', the right hand side of expression
(1) = 1/2. Let b2 > 2b,. Then the left hand will be less than 1/2 so the drafters should propose
rule s 2 .
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dyads value their rule. In addition, a tailored default rule is said to be ef-
ficient even though a minority prefers it when the rule creates greater
benefits overall. Our analysis shows that the tailored default rule concept
is subsumed under the general category of welfare-maximizing defaults.
Of greater significance, the empirical burden facing drafters is severe
even in this very simple case. To see why, assume that in choosing be-
tween the two termination rules the drafters proceed individually context
by context, investigating how the two rules would apply to contracts be-
tween retailers that sell electronic equipment and the equipment makers.
The drafters would have to know how many such contracts would be
made in the United States in a particular period-the NE in the analysis,
the portion of the parties that make these contracts that prefer one rule or
the other-the a in the analysis, and the total returns the NE dyads would
get from the rules-the b terms. Our assumption that every nea dyad and
every neb dyad get the same benefit from their preferred rule simplifies
the problem of finding benefits: the drafters can sample a dyad that pre-
fers s' and a dyad that prefers s 2 to learn their benefits from the termina-
tion term they like and then multiply the results by aNE and (1 - a)NE. It
is more realistic, however, to suppose that different contracting dyads in
different industry contexts and in different geographic areas get different
benefits from termination clauses. If this is so, the drafters would have to
learn the benefits that various firms would realize from rules s1 and S2
and then sum these up in order to solve their maximization problem.
We next relax the assumption that firms are unaffected when drafters
do not choose their preferred rules. In the first case, we let contracting
parties that prefer rule s 2 get benefit b 2(SI) > 0 from rule s'. Then the
drafters should choose rule s, if:
b1  1- a(2) b, > 1-ab 2 - b2 (S') a
Inequality (2) is easier to satisfy than inequality (1) above because the
left hand side is larger. Intuitively, rule s' becomes more attractive rela-
tive to rule s2 if the rule neb dyads get a positive benefit from s1 . But now
the drafters also must learn how much these dyads benefit from the rule
they prefer less.
Next, we consider the canonical case in which b2 (SI) < 0: choosing s'





b2 + (b2)(s1) a
Inequality (3) is harder to satisfy than inequality (1) because the left
hand side is smaller. Intuitively, rule s' becomes less desirable relative
to rule S2 if s1 imposes costs on the neb dyads, which prefer their own
rule. The drafters thus must know how costly s' actually would be for
the neb types.
The drafters may have to know two more things. First, the neb dyads
may contract out to rule S2 if s' is costly to them. Initially, suppose that
every dyad in (1 - a)NE has the same contracting cost, c(s2). Then every
neb dyad would contract out when the contracting cost is less than the
rule mismatch cost: c(s2) < b 2 (S1). Substituting the contracting cost into
inequality (3) reduces the left hand side, and thus makes the inequality
easier to satisfy. Intuitively, rule s1 becomes more desirable relative to S2
the lower the costs that s' imposes on the neb dyads, and s1 would impose
the lowest cost when the neb dyads would contract out of it. The drafters
could sample one of the neb dyads to learn its contracting-out cost and
then calculate the total assuming every dyad has the same costs. But
contracting costs likely vary across firms. If so, then some neb dyads
may contract out while other dyads for whom s' also is costly may not.
In this case, the drafters would have to learn what the total contracting
costs would be for the dyads that contract out, how many such dyads
there are and what the total costs would be for the dyads that accept rule
1 126S.
Second, we have assumed that rule S2 would not impose costs on the
no, dyads. This assumption seems unrealistic. If we relax it, the numera-
tor in expression (1) becomes b, + b;(s2) and the expression is easier to
satisfy: rule s1 would become more favorable relative to s 2 . Intuitively,
the benefits to the neb dyads would have to be large enough to overcome
126 The costs of contracting out of a default rule may include more than legal and drafting
costs. For example, one party's request to contract out may permit the counterparty to draw
an adverse inference about the party's type (requesting an extensive warranty may indicate
carelessness in use) or permit the counterparty to price discriminate. See Omri Ben-Shahar &
John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651, 660-70
(2006); Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6, at 278-80. Because these costs are
particular to parties, drafters will find it difficult to sum up total "contracting costs" and
compare them to gains.
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both the lost benefits to the nea dyads and the costs that rule S 2 would
impose on them. But now the drafters would have to know what those
costs would be.
A numerical example may illuminate this presentation. Assume that
two-thirds of the industry prefers rule s', so the right hand side of the in-
equalities above equals one-half, and let by, the benefit nea dyads get
from their rule, equal 100. Then by inequality (1) the drafters should
propose s' if b2, the benefit the neb dyads would get from their rule, is
less than 200. But if b 2 = 220, the drafters should propose S 2 even though
only a minority prefers it. Next suppose that the neb dyads get a positive
benefit b 2 of 50 from their less-preferred rule s'. Then their foregone
gain from s' falls to 170 and, by inequality (2), rule s' should be pro-
posed: it would be the "majoritarian default." Suppose next, however,
that b2 = 175 but rule sl also imposes a cost of 50 on the neb dyads. Then
the left hand side of the denominator in expression (3) becomes
175 + 50 = 225 and the drafters again should propose rule s2, though a
majority prefers s'. Now assume that it would cost the neb dyads 30 to
contract for the rule they like. Because this is less than b 2(S1) = 50, these
dyads would contract out and the denominator in inequality (3) would
fall to 175 + 30 = 215. The left hand side would still be less than one-
half, though, so the drafters should continue with rule S2. In this last
case, however, assume that rule s2 would impose a cost of 50 on the nea
dyads. Then the left hand side of the expression becomes 0.7, which ex-
ceeds one half; rule sl is again the best.
To summarize the simplest case we can analyze: the drafters attempt
to solve a single contracting problem of drafting an optimal termination
clause for contracts between electronics manufacturers and their retail-
ers. There are only two solutions to the problem-rule sl or rule S2; and
there are only two possible contexts-those in which agents prefer s1
and those in which agents prefer S2. But drafters who want to maximize
welfare would not choose either of these rules just because a majority of
the agents prefers it. Rather, as the analysis and the example show, the
drafters would have to know the size of the majority, the benefit each of
the possibly desirable rules would create for the contracting dyads that
prefer it, the benefits and costs of the rule for the dyads that do not pre-
fer it, and the costs the disfavored dyads would incur if they contracted
to their preferred rule. Moreover, because the relevant parameters are




The drafters are lawyers who create restatements and uniform laws
over conference tables and they seldom could fill in the requisite
blanks-to know which welfare-maximizing term, s' or S 2, would be
best when both rules are implementable. In addition, when the drafters
consider other industries, the S(p) set probably will change: the optimal
termination default for clothing manufacturer/retailer contracts likely
differs from the optimal termination default for electronics manufactur-
er/retailer contracts. If so, the drafters could not apply the electronics in-
dustry solution-say rule s'-to the clothing industry; that is, sl would
be a contextual rule. As a consequence, the drafters would have to solve
the different problem the clothing industry would present. It is quite im-
probable that the drafters could choose efficient contract default rules to
regulate important aspects of every sale of goods in every industry in the
United States: there are too many contexts, too many possible rules and
too many contracting types. Indeed, in Part IV we show that the solu-
tions to many contracting problems are parameter specific, which im-
plies that the set of contracting preferences in an industry is coextensive
with the set of contracting dyads. The drafters could not satisfy this high
demand for rules. 127
B. Penalty Defaultsl28
Penalty defaults do not attempt to create optimal solutions to common
contracting problems. Rather, a penalty default is facilitative: the default
should induce the informed party to a potential contract to disclose pri-
vate payoff-relevant information to her counterparty. The penalty default
mechanism is supposed to work by creating a default rule that the better-
informed party dislikes. The uninformed party can infer the informed
party's private information from the contract term the informed party
proposes to displace the disfavored default. As measured by the litera-
ture, penalty defaults are widespread;1 2 9 as measured by the ability of
127 When contractual solutions are parameter specific, there is a set of potential solutions to
the problem at issue for each contracting dyad in the electronics industry set NE. Our hetero-
geneity assumption-that at least one dyad's preferred solution differs from the solutions
other dyads prefer-then implies that the drafters would have to solve the problem for many
of these dyads. This seems unfeasible.
128 Penalty defaults were first proposed as a separate default category in Ian Ayres & Rob-
ert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
Yale L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
129 See generally, Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 589 (2006).
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drafters to create them, they have been and will continue to be a null set.
This is because penalty defaults make at least as challenging information
demands on drafters as do majoritarian defaults.
The drafters could not create an efficient penalty default unless they
knew the solution set-the set of possibly efficient terms-for the con-
tracting problem that the penalty default is supposed to illuminate.
Drafters who know the solution set can identify the better informed par-
ty and discover the private information that the lesser informed party
needs in order to make an efficient contracting choice. The drafters,
however, would also have to know the informed party's best responses
to particular rules that the drafters could propose. Knowledge of best re-
sponses is necessary because different penalty defaults would induce the
informed party to communicate different information to the uninformed
party. The best penalty default would induce the most informative dis-
closure. It is difficult for drafters to access the requisite information re-
garding the range of solutions, the best responses of informed parties,
and the relevant contracting costs in order to choose efficient penalty de-
faults. In addition, there is a theoretical difficulty with penalty defaults:
contracting parties sometimes may be able conveniently to motivate the
revelation of private information on their own, which then contradicts
the rationale for having a penalty default.
We can illustrate the challenge facing drafters with a simple example.
The particular contracting problem is to induce sellers in a competitive
market to make an investment that would reduce the probability that the
sellers will breach. The efficient investment by sellers should turn on the
buyers' types. Thus, a seller should take more precautions to prevent
breach when buyers place a high value on performance than when buy-
ers place a low value on performance. The sellers, we assume, do not
know the valuations of particular buyers, but they do know the distribu-
tion of buyer values. One possible solution to the sellers' problem (and
to the drafters' problem) would be for the sellers to invest at the level
that would maximize the average buyer's return. This solution would in-
duce the sellers to propose contracts to potential buyers with the associ-
ated "average" price. Above-average buyers may dislike this contract
because the seller invests too little in precautions for them, and below-
average buyers also may dislike the contract because the seller invests
too much for them. The average price contract, however, may be an effi-
cient "penalty contract" if either the high-valuing or the low-valuing
buyers would reject it in favor of a contract that better suits their prefer-
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ences. The rejecting buyers would thereby reveal their valuations and by
doing so reveal the valuations of the buyers who accept the average
price contract. As a consequence, the seller could efficiently tailor her
precautions to the buyers' types. A penalty default rule, following this
example, would replicate the contractual solution: the default would re-
quire sellers to pay average damages to buyers in the event of breach ra-
ther than pay each buyer his actual valuation. 130
We can now make this example more concrete in order to exhibit the
strong information demands that creating efficient penalty default rules
would make on drafters. Assume that parties are in the shipping indus-
try. Following the model above, and also to keep things simple, assume
S(pj) = 2. There are two implementable solutions to the problem of in-
ducing efficient seller investment to ensure on-time deliveries: here rule
s1 requires breaching sellers to pay every buyer the low valuation v1; rule
s2, the "full compensation default," requires breaching sellers to pay eve-
ry buyer its valuation, whatever that valuation turns out to be. There are
two shipper/buyer types: ni buyers place a low value on on-time deliver-
ies and nh buyers place a high value on on-time deliveries. We have as
values v, < Vh. The question is whether sl or s2 is the efficient penalty de-
fault rule.
We begin with rule s', which requires seller/carriers to pay disap-
pointed shipper/buyers the low valuation v1. The sellers invest i(vd in
precautions to prevent breach, and offer contracts that charge the price
pt, which equals investment cost because price equals cost in competi-
tive markets. The n, low-valuing buyers accept this contract because it
efficiently reflects the cost of serving them. The nh high-valuing buyers
have an incentive to propose a different contract because the contract
that rule s' induces would undercompensate them by restricting their
damage recovery to the low value v1. The different proposed contract
would require a seller/carrier to pay the nh buyers the high valuation Vh
in the event of breach. If the nh buyers do propose the different contract,
however, the seller/carriers will know the buyers' valuations, and will
charge these buyers the higher price ph. Hence, if c is the cost to a buyer
of contracting out of the default, the nh buyers will propose the different
contract when Vh -Ph - C > vl - p, or when:
130 As all contracts teachers will recognize, this example draws from the celebrated case of
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151-52 (Exch.).
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(4) Vh -VI >Ph - P1 + C
The left hand side of expression (4) is the marginal gain in the high-
valuing buyers' return from the correct contract; the right hand side is
the marginal cost-the increase in the price the high-valuing buyers
would have to pay for full compensation plus the cost of proposing the
different contract. The nh buyers will contract out of the low compensa-
tion default when the marginal gain exceeds the marginal cost. If these
buyers do contract out, which we now assume, the sellers will know
both their valuations and, because there are only two buyer types, the ni
buyer valuations as well. Hence, rule s1 would be a good penalty default:
it induces buyers to separate into the two types, and so enables the
sellers to take efficient precautions for both.
Now consider rule S 2 that would award a buyer/shipper its valuation,
whatever that valuation turns out to be. Rule s2 increases the sell-
er/carriers' expected liability from v, to the market average, which lies
between v, and vh. The sellers thus increase their investment in precau-
tions and propose contracts that charge a higher price to reflect their in-
creased cost. The new investment level is i(v.) and the new price is p.,
which is greater than pi but less than Ph. The nh buyers now will not pro-
pose the different, accurate contract because they are fully compensated
if the seller breaches and they pay a price that is lower than the full
compensation price (which recall would be ph).
The low-valuation n, buyers also would benefit from rule s2 because
the sellers' increased investment in precautions that the rule induces in-
creases the likelihood that the sellers will make on time deliveries; this
increases an ni buyer's expected return. These buyers, however, would
have to pay a price that exceeds the prior low-valuation price pt. We de-
note the benefit to an n, buyer when the seller takes the average precau-
tion level vis. These buyers also will let the rule s 2 default stand, rather
than propose the contract that is correct for them, when the value in-
crease from the sellers' higher precaution level exceeds the necessary
price increase plus the cost of contracting for the lower price, or when:
(5) vI. - Vi > p. - p, + c
The left hand side of expression (5) is the marginal gain in the low-
valuing buyers' breach return; the right hand side is the marginal cost-
the increase in the contract price, which contracting out would save, plus
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the cost of getting the correct contract. To summarize, rule S2 is an inef-
ficient penalty default when, as is now assumed, both expressions (4)
and (5) are satisfied, because both buyer types will let the rule s2 default
stand. Under the pooling contract this default induces, where neither
buyer type is revealed, the sellers will choose the inefficient average
precaution level rather than tailor their precautions to each buyer type.
We can now illustrate the information demands that penalty defaults
make on drafters by reversing the results of the two expressions. First
reconsider the S2 full compensation default. As said, the nh buyers would
accept it but, if inequality (5) were not satisfied, the low-valuing ni buy-
ers would propose the low-valuation contract because it would be best
for them. The increase in these buyers' expected return in consequence
of the sellers' greater precautions that rule s2 induces would be lower
than the price increase the buyers would avoid plus the contracting cost
of getting the lower price. Hence, rule S2 now would be a good penalty
default because it would induce the low-valuing buyers to disclose,
thereby also revealing the high-valuing buyers' identities. Next recon-
sider the rule sl default. As said, the low-valuing ni buyers would accept
it but, if inequality (4) were not satisfied, the nh buyers would accept it
as well: their gain from greater precautions would not be worth the in-
creased price they would have to pay plus the cost of getting the correct
contract. Now rule s', which awards only the low valuation on breach, is
the inefficient penalty default: because both buyer types would let it
stand, the carrier/sellers could not know which buyers are which.
Whether rule s' or rule s2 should be the penalty default must turn, as
in the analysis in Section III.A above, on particular parameters-the
value of various precaution levels to shippers, the cost of various precau-
tion levels to carriers, and the costs of contracting out.131 Continuing
with this example, there are railroad carriers, trucking carriers, and air-
plane carriers; there are also many shipping types. There would likely
have to be penalty defaults for many transportation contexts. In addition,
our illustrations are too simple because the drafters will also have to
know the proportion of each buyer type in the market. For example, if
one buyer type is much more numerous than the other, the default, other
things equal, should induce the minority to propose the different con-
tract. This would reduce total contracting-out costs.
131 The example assumed that every buyer in the market has the same contracting costs.
The problem becomes more difficult if contracting costs vary.
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The penalty default concept entered into the contracts literature after
the Restatement and the UCC were created. The popularity of the con-
cept with academics, who often are the drafters, suggests, however, that
the default rule project may attempt to include penalty defaults in any
third Restatement or a revised Article 2. We show here that this would
be a mistake: the drafters would again be defeated by heterogeneity
among party types and among contracting contexts as well as by the
high demand for rules. In short, it would likely be impossible for future
default rule projects to propose efficient penalty default rules.1 32
Turning more directly to theory, a penalty default may be unnecessary
in any event to resolve the parties' contracting problem in this shipping
example. Let carriers agree to pay shippers their valuations for delay or
nondelivery, whatever those valuations turn out to be-the full compen-
sation default-but charge two prices: p* to shipper/buyers who remain
silent and p * - A to buyers who announce their valuations rather than
propose different contracts, where A is positive but small. Because every
buyer type would be fully compensated under this contract, all of the
buyers would take the small price reduction and make the announce-
ment. There would then be full revelation without either buyer type in-
curring contracting-out costs.1 3 3 The theoretical questions this example
raises are whether its, solution would work if it were also costly for buy-
ers to make credible value announcements and whether similar revela-
tion contracts exist in other contexts.' 34
Ian Ayres has argued that examples such as the one we analyze here
are too restrictive. In his view, a penalty default is a rule that induces
parties to reveal otherwise private information, and many current con-
132 Eric Posner uses different reasoning to reach the same solution. See Eric A. Posner,
There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 563, 565, 586-
87 (2006).
3 This solution was developed in Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default
Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 557, 561 (2006).
134 The example in the text assumed that sellers function in competitive markets, so that
prices equaled investment costs. When sellers have market power, they can price discrimi-
nate against the buyers, charging higher prices to those who value the good or service more
highly. See Alan Schwartz, Price Discrimination with Contract Terms: The Lost-Volume
Problem, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 394, 419, 421 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Price Dis-
crimination]. Buyers thus become reluctant to disclose. How penalty defaults would work in
such imperfectly competitive markets is poorly understood. Some of the complexities are
explored in Adler, supra note 117, at 1550-51, 1581; and Johnston, supra note 117, at 616-
18.
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tract law rules successfully perform this function.13 5 But even substan-
tive defaults reveal information to the other side when parties contract
out of them. Hence, Ayres's claim risks collapsing the penalty default
category into the general category of maximizing defaults. To avoid this
risk, the analyst should focus on the property of penalty defaults to in-
duce disclosure when disclosure would permit more efficient contracting
performances. But because this property is context dependent, we show
here that the drafters did not, and future drafters could not, create effi-
cient penalty defaults.' 3 6
C Sticky Defaults
A relatively new default rule concept is the "sticky default." A default
rule is sticky when the costs to parties of contracting out are high rela-
tive to the gains. Some defaults are naturally sticky: the relevant prob-
lem is hard for parties to solve in a different way. 137 A decision maker
can cause a default to be sticky either by choosing the default that is nat-
urally sticky or by creating obstacles to contracting out of the default the
decision maker proposes. Neither strategy is consistent with the purpose
of a default rule when parties understand the rule and their contracts do
not impose externalities on third parties. 138 A majoritarian default's pur-
pose is to solve a problem for many parties that the parties cannot con-
veniently solve for themselves. If a rule fails to solve the problem for a
particular contracting dyad, the state should attempt to reduce rather
than increase the dyad's cost of adopting a more suitable rule. Moreover,
135 Ayres, supra note 129, at 589-90, 617.
3 Ayres begins his argument that many penalty default rules exist by citing a Wisconsin
statute that sets the default interest rate for consumer loans, and so induces lenders who want
to charge higher rates to say so. Id. at 590. As the text notes, every rule that parties can
change communicates information when a party changes it. The issue is whether such
changes facilitate more efficient performances.
1 See Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boiler-
plate and the Limits of Contract Design 33-44 (2013).
138 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale
L.J. 2032, 2084-88 (2012) (identifying paternalism and negative externalities as core justifi-
cations for quasi-mandatory or sticky defaults). We consider the paternalism justification
below. Because we focus here on contracting between commercial entities and restrict our
analysis to contract law as such, we do not address the issue of how lawmakers can efficient-
ly use sticky defaults to reduce negative externalities. The externalities that firms create
commonly entail costs such as imposing environmental harms on society generally or erect-
ing barriers to entry. These behaviors are regulated by the environmental and antitrust laws,
and not by defaults created by common law courts and drafters.
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structural defaults and formulas do not need to be made sticky because
parties accept them, and penalty defaults are created just so parties will
contract out of them. Making structural and formula defaults sticky is
thus unnecessary and making penalty defaults sticky contradicts the ra-
tionale for the default. Because these are all the default types there are,
presumptively every default should be "smooth."
There may be a justification for sticky defaults, however, when par-
ties are uninformed about their legal relationship. Suppose that certain
contract terms or default rules are unlikely to be salient to typical parties
who would be bound by them. Courts and drafters respond to this sali-
ence concern with clear statement rules. For example, a warranty dis-
claimer must be conspicuously set out and use certain key words. 139 A
well-grounded, clear statement rule makes a default sticky, but in the
service of making contracting more informed.
A sticky default may also seem efficient if parties hold incorrect be-
liefs. Suppose, for example, that a party is likely to mistake the effect of
a default rule. Using the example set out in Section III.A above, there
are three cases to consider: the majority of contracting dyads in NA (1)
incorrectly believe that rule s1 is better for them than rule s2 and so
would let s' stand if drafters propose it; (2) incorrectly believe that s2 is
better for them than s' but would accept s' if it is proposed because their
wrongly understood gain from contracting to s2 is less than transaction
costs; (3) incorrectly believe that s1 is better for them than S2 and will
contract for s1 if drafters propose s2 . In the first case, the drafters should
propose s2 and in the second case, the drafters should propose s'. In the
third case, the drafters may consider proposing s2 but making it difficult
to change-creating a sticky default-because mistaken dyads would
otherwise incorrectly contract for rule s1 . But if S 2 really is best, the
drafters apparently should make the rule mandatory. 140 Under a manda-
139 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2014). The UCC contains some sticky defaults in the
sense just explained, but the drafters' purpose was not to make the defaults "sticky." Rather,
they wanted to induce efficient disclosures. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Sales Law and
the Contracting Process 190 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law].
14 But see Ayres, supra note 129, at 2084-96. Ayres argues that a quasi-mandatory, sticky
default can be justified in a case such as that discussed in the text because contracting parties
are likely to be heterogeneous. Thus, the degree to which the mistakenly favored term is ac-
tually less beneficial than the chosen default will vary with different dyads. Hence, he ar-
gues, permitting contracting out in circumstances where paternalism concerns are lower for
some parties than others can, in theory, improve efficiency. This argument, however, impos-
es informational demands on drafters and other rulemakers that are as equally implausible to
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tory rule, S2 will provide the contracting solution for every dyad rather
than only for high-transaction-cost dyads. The case for such a mandatory
rule is that the state should not defer to incorrect beliefs.
The case for a sticky default begins with the view that a party may
mistake her self-interest regarding a particular contracting choice be-
cause the issue is not salient to her or because she is prey to cognitive
error. Enacting s2 as the default may induce parties to take a second
look: to reconsider the reasoning that led them to prefer s' in light of the
state's clearly expressed view that S2 is the better term. Thus, the argu-
ment goes, a sticky default may be a good compromise between imple-
menting efficient solutions and respecting party autonomy. 141 This dis-
cussion seems unrealistic, however, because it presupposes that drafters
know what the efficient rule is, know the existence and extent of incor-
rect buyer beliefs, and know the size of the relevant transaction costs. As
we have argued, drafters seldom will know these things.14 2 Thus, apart
from clear statement rules, drafters cannot, and did not, create efficient
sticky defaults.
satisfy as the informational demands needed to create efficient majoritarian or penalty de-
faults. See supra Sections III.A and III.B.
141 This argument has much less traction in the commercial contexts we study here. De-
fault rules for commercial contracts commonly affect firms, and the usual presumption is
that firms can make efficient choices.
142 In the individual context, a sticky default is a "nudge." Because consumers are more
likely to mistakenly assess their self-interest than business parties are, a nudge may improve
welfare. For example, if an employer's retirement plan defaults employees away from indi-
vidual retirement accounts ("IRAs"), consumers' costs of changing terms are high, and IRAs
are best for savings, the state perhaps should default consumers into IRAs. The nudge solu-
tion is problematic, however, for two reasons. First, it can be difficult to identify the biases
that produce the behavior the regulator wants to change. See Alan Schwartz, Regulating for
Rationality, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1373, 1376, 1409-10 (2015). Second, autonomy may be
better protected with mandatory rules. See Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark
Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, in
Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging (A. Kemmerer et
al., eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 67, 69), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abst
ractid=2685832 [https://perma.cc/2WV8-JSZH]. Jacob Goldin recently developed methods
for recovering consumer preferences, and so knowing how to nudge, when the relevant cog-
nitive error is inconsistent choice. These methods make strong demands on regulators, such
as knowing the proportion and characteristics of the inconsistent choosers in relevant con-
texts. See Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral
Age, 125 Yale L.J. 226, 260-70 (2015). Goldin's methods thus should help a regulator cre-
ate nudges in highly specified contexts, but cannot support making general categories of de-
faults sticky. And any nudge raises the question asked above: if the state believes that IRAs
are best, should it implement this belief with a default or a mandatory rule?
Default Rule Project
We can now summarize what we have learned from the analysis in
Parts II and III. First, we now better understand why the default rules
that are found in the Restatement and the UCC largely solve the same
problems that the common law has already solved-they mainly repub-
lish the common law rules. And we further understand why the Restate-
ment and the UCC otherwise eschew the attempt to solve common con-
tracting problems with default rules. The inability of drafters to create
contextual defaults explains both phenomena. Second, future default rule
projects apparently will employ the same drafting processes. The draft-
ers have no fact-finding arm; they cannot hold hearings or call expert
witnesses. Nor do drafters have the resources to retain experts or com-
mission studies. Thus, the best-grounded prediction is that the products
emanating from any contemporary default rule project will not attempt
to implement default rules but will likely implement default standards.
We conclude our discussion of default rules by responding to the ar-
gument that contract law cannot do without defaults because contracts
inevitably contain gaps. In the nature of things, however, a residual judi-
cial default always exists. These residual defaults take two forms. The
first default is dismissal under the doctrine of indefiniteness. As noted
above, in many common law jurisdictions, and especially in New York,
courts dismiss cases brought to enforce obligationally incomplete
agreements.1 43 The other residual default is to choose a rule or standard
that decides the case. Whatever the comparative merits of these solu-
tions, there always is a default that will resolve an actual contract dis-
pute. The relevant question, therefore, is whether drafters should replace
the residual common law defaults with new rules or standards. We have
just argued that the common law is a better vehicle for creating rules
(and that few, if any, transcontextual rules remain to be discovered), and
we argue immediately below that efficient contractual standards are bet-
ter created by private contracting than by the default rule project. On our
view, therefore, drafters should let the common law residual defaults
stand.
143 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. In certain types of preliminary agreements,
courts enforce a duty to bargain in good faith despite the lack of agreement on material
terms. This doctrine, however, directs only the recovery of verifiable reliance costs in cases
where a party has behaved strategically in delaying a promised investment. For discussion,




The analysis thus far shows why the Restatement and the UCC con-
tain few default rules that regulate a transaction's substance or function
as penalties; such rules would have had to be conditioned on particular
contexts, particular party preferences, and particular costs and benefits.
In contrast, the defaults that emerged during the common law develop-
ment of contract had a special feature: they are context independent. As
most of these defaults were created before the default rule project was
underway, there was little space for drafters to create additional trans-
contextual rules. Thus, the drafters faced a choice: to reenact the com-
mon law and to create new transcontextual defaults, if any were possi-
ble, or to adopt transcontextual standards that apply in all contexts, as
context is revealed to a court ex post. The UCC and the Second Re-
statement drafters chose to adopt many standards-some replacing
common law default rules and others applying to substantive contracting
problems.'" In this Part, we argue that their choice was misguided, and
that it would be a serious error to repeat it.1 4 5
A. Default Standards
Drafters propose default standards for three reasons. In some cases,
the subject is controversial and strong interests on several sides lobby
the drafters intensively. Here, there are two possible equilibria.1 46 In the
first, the default rule project fails because each contending force can
block others' proposals. As examples, neither the proposed UCC Article
6 revision nor, more recently, the proposed Article 2 revision eventuated
in changes to the Code despite years of effort.1 4 7 In the second equilibri-
um, the drafters propose standards because they satisfy the drafters'
need to appear effective and do not disadvantage the interest groups; ra-
144 See supra note 85.
145 For a contrary view proposing criteria that courts and drafters can deploy to produce
efficient default rules and standards, see Steven J. Burton, Collapsing Illusions: Standards
for Setting Efficient Contract and Other Defaults, 91 Ind. L.J. 1063 (2016).
146 See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 17, at 610.
147 The European Draft Common Frame of Reference, which proposed major changes to
European contract law, also failed, apparently for similar reasons. See generally Study Grp.
on a Eur. Civ. Code & Research Grp. on EC Private Law, Principles, Definitions and Model
Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Christian von Bar et al.




ther, the political problem is shifted to courts. As examples, the Re-
statement of Products Liability and the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods use the word "reasonable" repeatedly in a number of sec-
tions and have scattered the reasonableness standard throughout many
others.1 48
Drafters also propose standards in the absence of political pressure.
As we discussed above, standards are proposed when it is practically
impossible to propose rules.14 9 In these cases, the drafters' choice is to
do nothing or to propose standards. Because drafters agree to serve in
order to be (and to appear) effective, they often propose standards.
Drafters also propose standards-the third reason-when they believe
the common law is too restrictive. For example, as we noted in Part II,
the common law created the indefiniteness rule, which provided that
parties were not bound to an agreement that failed to specify all material
terms.'50 Drafters of the UCC and the Restatement refrained the rule as a
standard, thus permitting courts to enforce contracts that lack material
terms when courts believed that the parties meant to be bound. 51
The first two reasons explain the existence of standards but cannot
justify them; the third reason states a normative case. We argue here
that, whatever the reason, default standards fail the acceptability con-
straint. We begin by distinguishing between real and supposed contrac-
tual gaps. A real gap exists when a court interpreting a contract cannot
find a written term that governs the problem at issue. The court neces-
sarily will either fill the gap and enforce the contract or dismiss the case.
In Part II, we argued that courts pursuing the gap-filling strategy will at-
tempt to fill real gaps with terms that are consistent with the contracting
parties' intentions, as other terms reveal those intentions. In contrast, a
supposed gap exists when drafters believe that contracting parties will
not create a term for a problem the parties may face. The drafters are not
148 See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales
Law, 25 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 446, 474 (2005); Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra
note 17, at 648-50.
149 See supra Part III.
1s0 See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916).
151 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2014); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(3) (1981). Part
III assumed that drafters want to maximize net social welfare. Reversing the common law
indefiniteness rule in favor of a standard, though mistaken in its effect, is consistent with an
effort to pursue this goal. We assume here that when drafters cannot enact a default rule be-
cause of political or information constraints, the drafters sometimes prefer to maximize their
reputations: that is, the drafters would rather substitute a standard for a rule than appear to be
ineffectual.
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constrained by actual party intentions, but rather by their view of what
future parties would accept. Unfortunately, the drafters have held mis-
taken views of what commercial parties would accept.
Default standards do not make informational demands on drafters.
For example, the drafters can propose a default standard that tells con-
tracting parties in every context to behave reasonably without knowing
how any of those contracting dyads actually behave or what their con-
tracting problems are. There is no need for drafters to provide such a
standard, however, because parties can create a contract term at virtually
no cost that tells each of them to behave reasonably as well. 152 One
might argue, however, that even though it is costless for parties to draft
standards, it sometimes is costly for parties to decide whether to regulate
their relationship with a standard or a rule. But it is also costly for par-
ties to decide whether to accept a default rule or to leave a contractual
gap. It is not customary to count such cognitive costs when choosing de-
fault rules because parties always have to think through their choices.
Rather, the policy-relevant question concerns the parties' marginal cost,
above the costs of thinking, of creating either a rule or a standard. As we
have seen, the marginal cost of creating a rule can be high because rule
creation would require drafters to investigate many contexts; the mar-
ginal cost of creating a standard approaches zero because standard crea-
tion frees drafters from investigating context altogether. Hence, the cog-
nitive cost case for standards does not get very far.
In addition, the cognitive argument just restates the case for majoritar-
ian defaults and thus it encounters the same difficulty. A contracting dy-
ad's choice between a rule and a standard, and if a standard just what
type, is contextual. It turns on whether a rule can give clear notice of re-
quired behavior, whether relevant information is more convenient to ac-
cess ex ante (a rule) or ex post (a standard), the risks and rewards of par-
ties' sharing decision-making power with a court, the relative costs of
152 As we noted in the Introduction, commercial parties can create contract standards of
reasonableness at virtually zero drafting costs. But as we point out here, such contract terms
shift contracting costs to the enforcement function. Because unmoored contractual standards
increase moral hazard risk and create other enforcement costs, parties reject them; the say-
ings in drafting costs are outweighed by the increase in expected enforcement costs. See
Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19, at 835-36; Robert E. Scott, Contract
Design and the Shading Problem, 99 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 24-27 (2015) [hereinafter Scott, The
Shading Problem].
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enforcing a rule or a standard, and other factors. 153 Drafters cannot iden-
tify the contexts in which a dyad's choice of a rule or a standard would
require thought and be consequential, and also be a choice that is too
costly for parties to make themselves. As a consequence, drafters cannot
access the relevant information to make rule/standard choices that would
satisfy the acceptability constraint. Hence, the case for standards pro-
posed by drafters is weak even if parties' cognitive costs are added to
their drafting costs.
A second justification for proposing standards is that parties some-
times do accept default standards. The best example is Delaware, whose
corporate code regulates the relationships among shareholders, manag-
ers, and directors with both rules and standards. There are two problems
with using Delaware as an example, however. First, many of its stand-
ards are mandatory. When they are not, parties frequently contract
out.154 Also, and importantly here, Delaware corporate law violates the
assumption we made in Section III.A that industries and trades are small
relative to the domain a rule or standard is intended to affect. In the case
of contract law, the domain is the U.S. economy. Yet in Delaware, the
"industry" and the rules' or standards' domain are coextensive. The in-
dustry is corporate governance and the domain in which Delaware rules
and standards operate is corporate governance. Moreover, Delaware
standards are applied by the Delaware Chancery Court-a specialized
court whose judges are corporate experts and who see the same type of
case repeatedly.1 55 Because Delaware corporate law applies over a very
limited domain, its legislature can create defaults based on well-
grounded predictions regarding the comparative merits of rules and
standards. In contrast, the domain of Delaware common law is the econ-
omy generally. Given this larger domain, the common law of contract in
153 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557 (1992); Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19.
154 See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment,
43 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 119, 120 n. 9 (2015) (noting companies routinely contract to elimi-
nate director liability for violating the duty of care and similarly contract out of the duty of
loyalty whenever possible); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); Peter Molk,
How Do L.L.C. Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. Corp. L.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssm.com/abstract-2754637 [https://perma.cc/SE8L-AXQ8].
iss For a discussion of the special advantages of the Delaware Chancery Court and other
expert tribunals in applying standards, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra
note 72, at 73-75, 88-92.
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Delaware unsurprisingly resembles New York contract law, with a set of
transcontextual defaults rules and few standards.
The case against default standards is illuminated by considering why
parties often reject externally imposed standards but sometimes create
their own. Part IV focuses on the former issue; Part V considers the lat-
ter. To begin, commercial parties generally prefer gaps to standards
when standards create moral hazard. 5 6 A party disappointed by how a
deal turns out may attempt to escape its obligations by claiming that its
counterparty behaved "unreasonably," in "bad faith," "unconscionably,"
violated a custom, and the like. Because such strategic claims sometimes
may escape summary judgment, parties prefer not to give each other the
opportunity to make them. 57
Applying this general insight to an important case, contract terms that
parties would use when they are symmetrically informed about payoff
relevant information create moral hazard when information is incom-
plete. In these cases, parties eschew the "full information terms"- that
is, they leave gaps-in favor of the option to renegotiate subsequently.
In some later states of the world, both parties will want to perform the
initial contract; in other states, at least one party will not. The terms that
the parties did write are the disagreement points that channel the ex post
renegotiation bargaining game. Were a standard to be potentially appli-
cable, however, one party might believe that it could do better by avoid-
ing renegotiation and instead attempting to persuade a court to apply the
contractual standard in its favor. By increasing the burden on a court to
characterize a contracting party's behavior accurately, a standard also
156 We do not argue that vague standards in commercial contracts inevitably increase the
risk of moral hazard. As we show in Part V, commercial parties reject unmoored default
standards because they create moral hazard and instead draft contextualized standards that
are parameter specific. Thus, while it is common to find standards requiring "best efforts"
and "commercially reasonable efforts" in commercial contracts, they are inevitably paired
with parameter-specific rules or instructions that limit the discretion of a later court should
litigation result. Contextualization of standards can occur in many different forms. For ex-
ample, Albert Choi and George Triantis have argued that parties can, in theory, combine
vague standards with parameter-specific liquidated damages clauses to promote settlement
and avoid litigation. See generally Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in
the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. Legal Stud. 503 (2008); Albert Choi & George Tri-
antis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119
Yale L.J. 848 (2010).
1 Cf. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 96, at 71, 76 fig. 1, 83-102 (showing
that parties routinely attempt to prevent courts from using custom evidence); Scott, The




increases the likelihood of a court making a mistake in interpreting the
contract's terms. Correspondingly, it increases the incentive for the party
disfavored by subsequent events to engage in opportunistic litigation.
Parties ex ante prefer a gap to a default standard that would permit this
strategic behavior.
Examples may help clarify this point. Consider a firm that has sales
agents visit potential customers in various locations but cannot observe
how the agents conduct visits. The contracts between firms and these
agents do not condition the agent's compensation on her behavior,
which they would do if the principal could observe the behavior. If the
contract did pay the agent more if she worked harder, the agent may
claim she made many sales visits and sold as diligently as she could.
Hence, the usual contract conditions the agent's compensation on her
output-a variable that typically is measurable. If exogenous events
cause the sales scheme to be unusually successful or unusually unsuc-
cessful, the parties may renegotiate to change the contract's terms. As
another example, a complete contract between a manufacturer and its re-
tailers would vary the price with the demand in the retailers' markets by
charging high prices in high-demand states and low prices otherwise.
But parties do not make such contracts when the manufacturer cannot
observe demand. If the contract did condition prices on demand, the re-
tailers would always report low demand in order to get lower prices.
Parties thus use simple fixed price contracts that suit the most likely de-
mand states. When the ex post state differs materially from the average,
parties often renegotiate the contracts.158
Now consider how possible default standards might regulate these
cases: (1) sales agents should "exert the effort that is reasonable under
the circumstances"; or (2) the price should be "reasonable in light of ac-
tual demand." Contracting parties eschew standards such as these not
because they are costly to create but because the reasonable effort stand-
ard would condition on the sales agents' behavior and the reasonable
price standard would condition on the retailers' demand. Both standards
thus would make possible the strategic behavior that the parties sought
to avoid by writing simple, incomplete contracts.15 9
Part IV below describes simple linear contracts that attempt to induce optimal invest-
ment in the subject of the contract.
159 See generally Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6; see also Gilson, Sabel, &
Scott, Text and Context, supra note 72, at 60-63.
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To summarize, contracts between business parties either contain the
standards that parties prefer or the contracts deliberately contain gaps. In
the former case, a legal default standard is unnecessary and in the latter
case parties prefer the gaps. 160 Thus, there is no space for a default
standards project to occupy. The analysis in Part V bolsters this conclu-
sion by describing contracts in common use. Its goal is to show that par-
ties often prefer "rule-like" terms to standards, and that standards are on-
ly used in combination with such terms where they are contextualized to
the contracting parties' circumstances.1 61 Before reaching this subject,
we briefly consider mandatory standards.
B. Mandatory Standards
A mandatory standard channels behavior rather than facilitates con-
tracting. Substantive standards are justifiable when contracts create neg-
ative externalities or the contracting process is flawed. But drafters are
ill-equipped to propose such standards to regulate either externalities or
the bargaining process effectively. When externality behavior is system-
atic, it is usually outside the drafters' jurisdiction. Price-fixing and envi-
ronmental degradation are examples of externalities that are regulated by
antitrust and environmental law. As noted above, flawed contracting
processes are regulated under the common law rules of fraud and duress
and the unconscionability doctrine, or by statute or agency rule. When
behavior is context specific, it is best regulated by rules. And then the
concerns explicated in Part Ill apply. The drafters' limited ability to find
facts would also prevent the drafters from regulating common externali-
ties or the bargaining process with effective mandatory standards.
Even a critic of standards may believe, however, that the mandatory
standards of good faith and commercially reasonable behavior should be
a part of contract law. These standards regulate the performance and en-
forcement of contracts rather than the bargaining process: they are help-
ful in rooting out strategic behavior in contracts between individual per-
6 0 We show in Part V when and how contracting parties use standards.
161 Louis Kaplow observes that a court functioning under a standard can create a rule-like
solution by using evidence that is revealed ex post. This does not convert the standard into a
rule, however, because future parties will lack much of the information that the prior court
used. Thus, the standard remains a standard for the future parties. See Louis Kaplow, Infor-




sons, and between firms and consumers.1 62 They are inapt regulators of
business behavior, however, where strategic behavior is more difficult to
detect. 163 Begin by distinguishing the standard of commercial reasona-
bleness and the duty of good faith from the substantive standards that
regulate the bargaining process. The UCC standard of commercial rea-
sonableness is designed to direct an empirical inquiry: the court is in-
structed to look to the settled customs in the trade against which to
measure the behavior in question.'" But there is virtually no evidence
that courts, even those operating under the UCC's invitation to broadly
examine context, actually undertake such empirical investigations, and
hence little reason to imagine they could succeed if they did.1 65 Similar-
ly, the duty of good faith, in commercial contexts, is actually an inter-
pretive rule: courts apply the duty by inferring the parties' contracting
goals from the written terms, and then evaluate behavior that the con-
tract did not explicitly regulate in light of those goals.1 66 The duty thus
seems duplicative because the existing interpretive rules authorize courts
to make precisely these evaluations. Moreover, the duty should be man-
datory only if interpretive rules should generally be mandatory. We have
argued elsewhere that interpretive rules should be defaults. 167 Therefore,
there is apparently no meaningful role for an independent duty of good
faith or for a commercial reasonableness standard to play in a business
contract law. 1 68
V. CONTRACTING BEHAVIOR
We have argued thus far that the set of problems the default rule pro-
ject can solve narrows considerably if solutions to many contract prob-
lems are parameter specific: different contracting dyads would solve
162 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 72, at 38.
163 Scott, The Shading Problem, supra note 152, at 12-17.
16 Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law, supra note 139, at 5.
165 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2014) ("[T]he doctrine of good faith merely directs a
court towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are created,
performed, and enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness
which can be independently breached.").
167 See Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux, supra note 95; Schwartz & Watson, supra
note 105.
16 Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in
Good Faith, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 319 (2002); Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra
note 6, at 596-98; Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux, supra note 95, at 944-47.
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similar problems with different terms. This claim supports two conten-
tions that we have advanced thus far. The first contention is that there
are relatively few transcontextual default rules and most of those have
already emerged through the common law process. The second conten-
tion is that contracting parties reject default standards because they fail
to solve the specific problems contracting parties face. Yet, not all solu-
tions are context or parameter specific, and this suggests an additional
explanation for contracting gaps. In the common view, parties leave a
gap in their contract when the costs of solving the relevant problem ex-
ceed the gains or when a term would condition on unobservable infor-
mation. Parties also leave gaps when they accept the legal default. In-
deed, it is this practice that makes the process of common law rule
creation possible. It follows that if contracting parties accept the trans-
contextual defaults but reject the others, our argument that solutions to
common contracting problems are parameter specific would be strength-
ened. There is some evidence that parties do act in this way. For exam-
ple, except when specifying liquidated damages, parties seem never to
contract out of market or cover damages, which are formulas. 169 In con-
trast, parties routinely contract out of consequential damages. 170 Conse-
quential damages are parameter specific-one buyer's valuation differs
from another's-and valuations and profits are often unverifiable.171
In this Part, we offer further support for our earlier claim that many
commercial contracts are parameter specific by briefly summarizing
contract types in common use. Rules that regulate business practices but
do not rest on an understanding of those practices have had, and will
have, little survivorship value. We begin with long-term procurement
contracts. The common goal of parties to these contracts is to ensure that
current-period prices are consistent with current-period costs. Parties
pursue this goal with a mechanism-the index clause-that links current
prices to verifiable data, such as exogenously posted prices or price indi-
ces that correlate with the parties' (unverifiable) actual costs or de-
169 Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 104, at 1614 n.11, 1624-29.
170 See, e.g., infra notes 172, 174, 179, 180, 184, 185, and 186 (examples of contracts). For
discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law, supra note 139, at 204-07.
17 It is sometimes suggested that parties omit remedy terms because they do not think
about breach. This claim is inconsistent with the common practices of excluding consequen-
tial damages, disclaiming warranties, and writing liquidated damage clauses (which are pa-
rameter specific because they condition on the buyer's expectation).
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mand. 1 72 Index clauses are commonly negotiated, and the information
they use and the pricing formulas they create vary across contracting dy-
ads.
Long-term procurement contracts must also adjust to exogenously in-
duced changes in the efficient quantities of goods the buyer requires or
the seller is obligated to supply. The Restatement and the UCC regulate
these requirements and output contracts by combining a formula with a
contextualized standard: a buyer cannot demand nor can a seller produce
a quantity that is "unreasonably disproportionate" to the quantities the
parties themselves traded in prior periods. 173 The formula component of
the rule is applicable everywhere because it requires the court just to
compare two numbers: past and current orders. The standard component
is not free floating because courts adjudicate disproportion by anchoring
on the parties' experience under the contract. Consistent with our argu-
ment, although parties commonly create parameter-specific index claus-
es to regulate needed price changes, they often accept the legal default
for needed quantity changes. 174
Sellers with market power facing buyers, whose demands are private
information, sometimes permit the buyers to choose the governing con-
tract from a menu the seller supplies. The contracts in these menus vary
by price, quality, down payment, or other features. As in the penalty de-
fault rule example above, different buyer types prefer different contracts;
hence, a buyer's choice reveals its demand and may reveal the demands
of other buyers. The seller can thus charge higher-valuing buyers more
172 See, e.g., General Terms Agreement between Boeing Co. & Spirit Aerosystems, Inc.
(June 30, 2006) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (general terms agree-
ment using parameter-specific price index to cover purchase orders by Boeing for particular
product to be supplied by Spirit); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc.,
499 F. Supp. 53, 57-59 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (parameter-specific index clause in fifteen-year
contract manufacturing agreement).
173 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2014); id. § 2-306 cmt. 3 ("Any minimum or maximum
set by the agreement shows a clear limit on the intended elasticity. In similar fashion, the
agreed estimate is to be regarded as a center around which the parties intend the variation to
occur."); cf. Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the use of an estimate as a constraint on good faith in the case of an underdemand-
in buyer).
1 See, e.g., Component Supply Agreement between Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. & Gen. Mo-
tors Corp. (June 5, 1998) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (requirements
contract for motor vehicle components to be supplied by AAM to GM); E. Air Lines, Inc., v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 434 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1975) ("Gulf agrees to sell and deliver
to Eastern, and Eastern agrees to purchase, receive and pay for their requirements of Gulf Jet
A and Gulf Jet A-1 at the locations listed .... ).
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than it charges low-valuing buyers. 175 Menu contracts are parameter
specific because sellers with market power usually face different distri-
butions of buyer values. Therefore, a contract menu that induces revela-
tion in one context would not induce it in another.
Contracts also attempt to induce parties to invest efficiently in the
contract transaction or to produce and trade efficient quantities or quali-
ties. Because parties can seldom observe each other's investment behav-
ior, efficient investment-inducing contracts can be complex. 176 In prac-
tice, however, contracting parties often use simple linear contracts. 177 To
see how such a contract works, assume that a buyer cannot observe the
seller's investment level but the buyer can observe the seller's output.
The parties may then create a schedule that specifies a payment for eve-
ry possible output level the seller could produce. Because the schedule is
set in advance, the seller becomes the residual claimant: it keeps the dif-
ference between the price the schedule dictates and its production cost.
Consequently, the seller chooses the output level that maximizes the dif-
ference between these variables.1 78 These efficient contracts are parame-
ter specific because they condition on the buyer's needs and the seller's
production capacity.
Linear contracts may also be used in other common principal and
agent contexts.1 7 9 For example, assume that a principal knows some of
the actions the agent may take to produce goods or services, but she does
not know the full set of actions available to the agent. The principal can
maximize her return by specifying each party's share of the surplus ac-
175 See Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, Do Sellers Offer Menus to Separate Buyer
Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory, 89 Games & Econ. Behav. 17
(2015); Schwartz, Price Discrimination, supra note 134, at 398.
176 See generally Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Con-
tracting, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (2004) (summarizing early theoretically efficient contracts).
177 See, e.g., Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-sided Moral Hazard
and the Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. Econ. 761, 763-64 (1995) ("Linear pricing
rules have been found in a number of diverse areas such as ... sharecropping, leasing ar-
rangements, author's fees, legal fees, licensing arrangements, commercial real estate rental
fees and franchising.").
1 See Arup Bose, Debashi Pal & David E.M. Sappington, On the Performance of Linear
Contracts, 20 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 159 (2011).
179 See, e.g., Data Management Outsourcing Agreement between Allstate Ins. Co. &
Acxiom Corp. (Mar. 19, 1999), http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.199
9.03.19.shtml [https://perma.cc/B5TP-HXZT] (linear contract for Acxiom to develop a data-




cruing from whatever output the agent produces.'80 This share divides
the surplus from the best possible action available to the agent and
known to the principal (equal-share splits are common). 1 Because the
agent can keep fifty percent of every possible surplus the agent could
produce, the agent is induced to choose the action that generates the big-
gest surplus. The principal thus realizes the prespecified share of the
maximum feasible surplus even though the principal cannot know all of
the actions the agent might take.' 82 These linear contracts also are pa-
rameter specific because they condition on particular agent's choices.
In another common case, a buyer may contemplate making a sunk
cost investment that would increase the transaction's value, but the buy-
er believes that the seller will renegotiate the price upward when the
seller learns that the buyer has invested. As a consequence, the buyer
may not make the investment. A possibly efficient solution to this prob-
lem is a contract term that conditions the buyer's payoffs on the possible
outcomes from investing that various buyer types could potentially
achieve. The contract has an updating mechanism so that when the buyer
announces the result of its investment, the contract conditions the buy-
er's payoff on an updated distribution of buyer values that is consistent
with the buyer's announcement. In this way, the buyer is induced to in-
vest efficiently because he is ensured a part of the surplus his investment
creates and the contract is never renegotiated: the buyer thus is never
disadvantaged by sinking costs in the contract project. As the paper de-
180 See, e.g., Distribution Agreement between Microblend LLC & Mobil Oil Corp. § § 4.1,
4.2, 4.3 (June 30, 1998) [hereinafter Microblend-Mobil Distribution Agreement] (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (dividing surplus by a percentage of net re-
ceipts); Assignment and License Agreement between Aerocrene and lonics, Inc. (June 16,
2004) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (same). In some distribution con-
tracts, the surplus is a function of both the gross revenues and the agent's costs and the latter
may be unobservable. In this case, parties will avoid a "net profits" solution and, instead, tie
the agent's efforts to a share of the gross revenues. See Charles G. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1106-11 (1981); cf. Victor P. Gold-
berg, Essay, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524, 524-27 (1997) (exploring why
the entertainment industry continues to use net profit participation given the moral hazard
risks of such an arrangement).
181 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (holding the
agent was entitled to one-half of "all profits and revenues"); Gabriel Carroll, Robustness and
Linear Contracts, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 536, 536-37 (2015).
182 See Caroll, supra note 181, at 537.
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scribing these updating mechanisms recites, "[w]hat outcome functions
are optimal will depend on the particular circumstances."' 8 3
Parties to franchise or distribution contracts often require franchisees
or distributors to use their "best efforts" (and similar standards) in per-
forming the contract. 18 4 Such standards, however, are often preceded by
instructions that contextualize the broad standard. For example, parties
may describe in the contract the context that will be relevant-what in-
dustry, what kind of products, and, when possible, the evidence the court
should use to measure performance under the standard.185 Alternatively,
the contract may provide a list of specific actions the agent is required to
undertake as exemplars of behavior that meets the best efforts stand-
ard.186 A reviewing court can infuse content into a standard such as best
efforts by inferring the parties' general goals from the contract's descrip-
tive clauses and detailed rules.187 Hence, when a party takes an action
that the rules do not regulate, the court can evaluate that action in light
of those goals. A court, for example, could distinguish efficient best ef-
forts in a franchise context from efficient best efforts in a distribution
183 See Robert Evans & Sanje.Reiche, Contract Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotia-
tion, 157 J. Econ. Theory 1159, 1160 (2015).
184 See Univ. of Mo.-Columbia, Contracting and Orgs. Research Inst., CORI Contracts Li-
brary, http://cori.missouri.edu (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/DW4G-4D93]
(total contracts in CORI database: 690,000; contracts with "best efforts" terms: 190,117
(27.6%)).
185 See, for example, the "purpose" clause from the Fountain Manufacturing Agreement
between Apple Comput., Inc. & SCI Sys., Inc. (May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Apple-SCI Foun-
tain Agreement], http://contracts.onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [https://per
ma.cc/ERT4-3GUF]; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 72, at 58-60.
186 See, e.g., Microblend-Mobil Distribution Agreement, supra note 180 ("best efforts" ob-
ligation contextualized by instructing Mobil to "1) provid[e] demonstrations of the Products
to potential customers, 2) assist[] Microblend in discharging Microblend's obligation under
its warranties relating to the Product: 3) submit[] to Microblend at least thirty (30) days prior
to the start of each calendar quarter, a quarterly forecast for the upcoming six months; 4) as-
sist[] Microblend in determining the credit worthiness of any distributor; and 5) otherwise
assist[] Microblend in the sale and marketing of the Products as the parties may from time to
time agree.").
187 See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19, at 851-56 (reporting the
results of a sample of contracts that combine standards with rules so as to contextualize the
standard). A standard on its own gives the court a relatively large space within which to de-
cide whether the agent's actions constitute best efforts. Where the parties combine standards
and rules that relate to the same subject matter, the ejusdem generis canon applies, whether
the general language is preceded or followed by the enumerated precise terms. The meaning
of the general language is then limited to matters similar in kind or classification to the enu-
merated precise terms. See, e.g., Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (holding that an
enumeration which included "any horse, mule, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat" excluded turkeys).
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context.' 88 Courts do not receive similar guidance from a Restatement or
UCC standard that requires parties to perform contracts "reasonably"
because statutory standards cannot be preceded by context-specific
rules.
Turning to unforeseen circumstances (rather than hidden actions), the
franchisor or distributor also contracts for its counterparty's expertise:
an ultimate aim of the contract is to secure the counterparty's active ex-
ercise of judgment. When circumstances change in an unanticipated
way, the agent's obligation is to apply its expertise to adjust effectively
to the new conditions.1 89 This form of relationship is memorialized in a
formal contract through contextualized standards that limit the court's
discretion by specifying in greater detail the context that will be relevant
and, when possible, the relevant proxy the court should use to measure
performance under the standard.190 Here, the contractually specified
standard directs the court to make use of context, but limits its inquiry
into contexts that are relevant to the particular obligation embedded in
the standard.191
Finally, under conditions of high uncertainty, firms may form collab-
orative contracts (or "hybrid arrangements") to create a new product,
such as a drug, a software platform, or an aircraft design.1 92 Collabora-
188 See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19, at 848-51; Scott &
Triantis, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 19, at 197-98 (describing the various contract
maxims that contextualize the standard).
189 See, e.g., Tolling Agreement between Liberty Elec. Power, LLC & PG&E Energy
Trading-Power, L.P. (Apr. 14, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
("The Party whose performance under this Tolling Agreement is affected by an event of
Force Majeure shall . .. use all commercially reasonable efforts to remedy the cause(s) and
effect(s) of such Force Majeure event with all reasonable dispatch.").
190 See, e.g., id. § 18.1(b), (c)(i)(ii).
191 Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 19, at 851-56. As noted in the text,
commercial contracts often include both precise rules and contextualized standards, and
courts actively interpret and enforce such standards by reference to prescribed context evi-
dence. In terms of the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post contracting costs, the use of a
standard-even a contextualized one-as opposed to a rule necessarily increases ex post
contracting costs. It is harder to verify performance when specified by a standard; the court
must first identify a "proxy" against which to measure performance, an intermediate step that
is not required when the contract specifies precisely the terms of performance. For this rea-
son, disagreement over whether a performance standard has been met is much less amenable
to pretrial resolution than is a rule, and the potential for moral hazard-the party disfavored
by the change in circumstances opportunistically resorting to litigation to mislead a court
into reallocating the burden of events in its favor-is increased.
192 See, e.g., Agreement between Phoenix Techs. Ltd. & Intel Corp. (Dec. 18, 1995),
http://contracts.onecle.com/phoenix-tech/intel.supply. 1995.12.18.shtml [https://perma.cc/PP
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 102:1523
tive contracts are formed when the parties to them have complementary
skills, such as research and marketing. These arrangements are not gov-
erned by procurement contracts because, at the outset, there is nothing to
procure: there is no new drug and there may never be one. These agree-
ments present unique contracting problems because each party's actions,
and the results of those actions, are commonly unobservable to the other
party. Hence, a party may shirk in the hope its partner will invest active-
ly, or misreport the results of its investment to renegotiate to a better di-
vision of the surplus. The agreement will fail, however, if parties under-
invest or misreport, or it may not form when potential partners anticipate
such strategic behavior. Parties nevertheless form collaborative contracts
and govern them under complex "framework agreements" that create
dispute resolution mechanisms, punish defectors, and allocate expected
surplus so as to induce efficient behavior.1 93 The framework agreements
are parameter specific because they are individually designed.
To summarize, commercial parties solve the substantive contracting
problems they face with parameter-specific, rule-like terms and contex-
tualized standards. These parties primarily need the state to provide effi-
T5-LPZR] (supply contract for Phoenix to be a principal supplier of system-level software to
Intel); Development Agreement between Nanosys, Inc. and Matsushita Elec. Works, Ltd.
(Nov. 18, 2002), http://contracts.onecle.com/nanosys/matsushita.rd.2002.11.18.shtml [http
s://perma.cc/VFU7-9T3V] (collaboration agreement to develop photovoltaic devices with
nanocomponents in Asia); Apple-SCI Fountain Agreement, supra note 185 (contract manu-
facturing agreement for SCI to produce designated products at Apple's Fountain, Colorado,
plant); Research, Development and License Agreement between Warner-Lambert Co. &
Ligand Pharma., Inc. (Sept. 1, 1999), http://contracts.onecle.comligand/wamer.rd.1999.09.0
1.shtml [https://perma.cc/FCN4-3DKX] (pharmaceutical research and development collabo-
ration between "big pharma" and "little pharma"); Collaboration and License Agreement
between Pharmacopeia, Inc. & Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (Nov. 26, 1997), http://contracts.on
ecle.com/alpha/471.shtml [https://perma.cc/22PL-L6NY] (same); Long Term Agreement
between John Deere & Co. & Stanadyne Corp. (Dec. 14, 2001) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration sys-
tems, injection nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne). For discussion see
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431 (2009) [hereinafter Gil-
son, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation].
193 For detailed descriptions of how collaborative contracts and other hybrid arrangements
are created, function, and should be interpreted see generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F.
Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in
Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377 (2010); Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 192; and Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context,
supra note 72. A theoretical explanation of hybrid arrangement contracts is provided in Tra-
cy R. Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Pay for Play: A Theory of Hybrid Relationships, 17 Am. L. &
Econ. Rev. 462 (2015).
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cient enforcement, accurate interpretation, and deterrence of bad behav-
ior.194 They do not need substantive default rules, which drafters cannot
effectively create, or default standards, which would permit a dissatis-
fied contracting party to later undo the parties' contractual scheme. Con-
tracting parties do benefit, however, from transcontextual defaults such
as those that have evolved through the common law process because
these efficiently solve certain contracting problems and so save parties
the costs of creating the defaults themselves.
CONCLUSION
The Anglo-American nineteenth-century contract law contained rela-
tively few default rules and these rules had a particular character: they
could be applied almost everywhere. Thus, the rule that an acceptance
had to mirror the offer could be applied just by comparing the offer and
the acceptance, whatever the content of those communications. Twenti-
eth-century commentators and, largely in consequence of their views,
the drafters who embarked on the default rule project believed that there
were too few common law rules given the complexity of modem con-
tracting behavior. Also, when a rule was apt, courts often applied the
rule rigidly, without an appreciation of the parties' actual intentions or
the parties' context. The drafters' project, as the UCC recited, was to
"modernize" commercial law by expanding the set of default rules
courts could use, and by empowering courts, through the use of stand-
ards, to enforce the parties' actual deal rather than the deal that could be
inferred only from what the parties wrote down.
The lawyers and academics who began the default rule project misap-
prehended both the value of the common law process and their own ca-
pacity to provide useful improvements. The common law of contract
was well suited to business behavior just because it was the common
law. Because the law was a set of defaults, a rule could exist through
time only if later parties in different contexts than the one that constitut-
ed the originating case accepted it. Therefore, enduring common law
rules have to be transcontextual; that is, they must be satisfactory to par-
194 Consistent with the arguments we have advanced in this Article, our ultimate claim is
that it is the parties (through contract design) and not the courts that better know (1) the
agreements they wish courts to enforce, (2) the interpretive style they prefer courts to use in
resolving disputes, and (3) how best to reduce the risks of opportunism in contract perfor-
mance. See generally Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux, supra note 95; Schwartz &
Scott, Precontractual Liability, supra note 115; Scott, The Shading Problem, supra note 152.
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ties over broad sections of the economy. The common law of contract
has few default rules because few rules can satisfy the structural re-
quirement that they are (almost) everywhere applicable just because
commercial parties (almost) everywhere like them.
This "acceptability constraint" bound the original drafters as well as
judges. When the default rule project began, most of the transcontextual
rules were already widely recognized and new substantive rules would
be acceptable to business parties-they would solve parties' contracting
problems-only if the rules conditioned on the parameters that parties
themselves would make dispositive. The drafters implicitly recognized
that they functioned under a severe constraint: they had neither the time
nor the resources to identify acceptable parameters for the almost count-
less contracts that heterogeneous parties make in a large modem econo-
my. And this is especially the case because many contracting solutions
are "parameter specific": the efficient index clause in the contract be-
tween Smith Co. and Jones Co. differs from the efficient index clause in
the contract between Roe Co. and Doe Co. Drafters could not write as
many index clauses as there are parties who want them both because the
drafters lack the information and because there are too many parties.
Facing these difficulties, the drafters created few contextual default
rules.
Rather, the drafters' failure lay in making the wrong choice between
doing a few things well and doing many things poorly. This is especially
the case in the decision to replace common law default rules with stand-
ards. Standards are attractive to drafters for three reasons: (1) they are
intrinsically transcontextual (parties everywhere can be told to behave
reasonably); (2) they satisfy the need to do something rather than do
nothing; and (3) in the view of some, they permit courts to complete
contracts in fair and efficient ways. Some commentators have observed
that business parties frequently use standards. Hence, to supply stand-
ards to parties whose contracts lack them was seen as performing the
usual gap-filling function.
This view also was mistaken. Creating rules to solve complex con-
tracting problems is costly for parties; creating broad standards to solve
complex contracting problems commonly is costless for parties. Hence,
the drafters should have asked why so many commercial contracts con-
tain gaps that parties could have filled with broad standards of reasona-
bleness, good faith and the like. Contracts contain "standards gaps"
when the parties prefer other solutions to the problem of adjusting to un-
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foreseen actions or future states. For example, parties often expect to re-
negotiate their contract to achieve efficient solutions when the realized
state of the world differs materially from the state the parties expected
probably would result. Also, commercial contracts contextualize the
standards they do adopt: the contracts combine standards with specific
rules or instructions so as to define the constraints or delimit the space
within which the standard is meant to function. Courts can infer the par-
ties' goals from these rules and instructions, and thus apply the standard
to advance those goals. Drafters could not write such contextualized
standards for the same reasons they could not write rules: they lacked
the information and the demand is too great. And unmoored standards-
those not combined with specific rules or illuminated by instructions
elsewhere in the contract-fail the acceptability constraint: they make
possible too much strategic behavior. In sum, it was a mistake for the
drafters of the UCC and the Second Restatement of Contracts to attempt
to replace or to supplement effective contract law transcontextual de-
faults with transcontextual standards, because these are either ineffective
or mischievous in operation.
Our analysis of the Restatement and the UCC should enable courts to
better understand why these defaults have the shape they do, and why
that shape largely reflects mistaken beliefs as to how best to regulate
business contracting. In particular, the UCC is law, but the Restatement
is not. New York closely follows the traditional common law in cases
not involving sales and it is widely popular with business parties. We
show that courts today should draw from the New York experience to
the extent they have discretion to do so and be as responsive as the law
permits to efforts by commercial parties to contract out of the drafters'
standards.
This Article's argument also has important implications for the future
project to draft a third Restatement of Contracts, which may well be
launched within the next several years,'9 5 and the effort to revise Article
2 may be revived. Because there is apparently no movement to change
the structural limitations of the default rule project, there is a serious
danger that these projects will repeat the failures of the past. Perhaps the
best that can be done is for future drafters to look to the experience of
business parties with the UCC and the Second Restatement. Drafters en-
listed in future restatement projects should heed the New York experi-
195 Email from Richard Revesz, supra note 27.
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ence and consider restoring the common law defaults that were replaced
by standards.
In any case, the unfortunate history of the default rule project is a cau-
tionary tale for future restatement and statutory efforts to create efficient
contractual defaults. To be sure, a historic function of the ALI restate-
ment projects has been to harmonize common law rules as they emerge
in different jurisdictions and choose the most apt and accurate formula-
tion of the common law rules.'9 6 This translation function serves to cap-
ture the rule in contemporary language and can reduce misunderstanding
and ambiguity. It remains an open question, however, whether that func-
tion alone is of sufficient value to justify further drafting efforts.
196 In truth, as Grant Gilmore noted, a great deal of harmonization has already occurred in
contract and commercial law, spurred particularly in the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry owing to the role of the Supreme Court of the United States as a "great commercial
court":
[T]he rules which [the Court] announced were, in nine cases out of ten, gladly fol-
lowed by the state courts as well as, of course, by the lower federal courts. A remark-
able degree of national uniformity in the law applicable to commercial transactions
was in fact achieved over a remarkably long period of time.
Grant Gilmore, Commercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and Other Misadven-
tures, in Aspects of Comparative Commercial Law: Sales, Consumer Credit, and Secured
Transactions 449, 454 (Jacob S. Zeigel & William F. Foster eds., 1969).
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